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Wouldn't it be better to save lives than to avenge
them?... Isn't it worth every investment necessary to
free the world from the threat of nuclear war?... Are
we not capable of demonstrating our peaceful intentions
by applying all our abilities and our ingenuity to
achieving a truly lasting stability?'
Ronald Reagan, 1983
64 PERCENT OF AMERICAN ADULTS BELIEVE THE UNITED
STATES HAS A MISSILE DEFENSE TO PROTECT AGAINST
NUCLEAR ATTACKS.
2
CBS News-New York Times survey, March 2001
I. INTRODUCTION
This comment will argue that National Missile Defense (NMD) is a
desirable form of national defense and also compatible with international
law. This comment begins with an exploration of the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty of 1972 and its legal significance as it has evolved over
time culminating with President George W. Bush's announcement on
December 13, 2001 to withdraw from the Treaty. Next, it examines the
past, current, and future forms of missile defense, including how these
forms interplay with international law. In the third section, criticisms of
missile defense will be evaluated and established to be unpersuasive,
especially in light of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. In the
1. President's Speech on Military Spending and a New Defense, N.Y. TIMES,
March 24, 1983, at A20.
2. Deroy Murdock, Missile Defense Remains Imperative, BOSTON HERALD, June
15, 2001, at 30 (quoting a survey conducted by CBS News and the New York Times in
March of 2001).
fourth section, the benefits and strengths of National Missile Defense
will be highlighted. In this section, through the use of an innovative
hypothetical, it will be demonstrated how National Missile Defense
actually discourages, rather than encourages (as many critics claim) a
first strike. Finally, the comment will conclude with a discussion of
National Missile Defense and its place in history, particularly given the
renewed efforts amongst democracies to expand the "Rule of Law"
worldwide.
I. THE LEGAL EVOLUTION OF THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE
TREATY OF 1972
A. Introductory Overview of the ABM Treaty & Its Development
from 1972-1991
President Richard M. Nixon and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev
signed the "Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems," (ABM
Treaty) which entered into force on October 3, 1972. 3 Only the United
States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were signatories to
the ABM Treaty. Experts generally agree that the ABM Treaty banned
all but the most simplistic forms of defense against intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBM), prohibiting the use of most radars, space-
based sensors, and remote sites for interceptors.4
More specifically, Article I, Section 2 provided the core prohibition on
missile defenses: "Each party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for
a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such
a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual
region except as provided in Article Ill." 5 One of those exceptions is
provided by Article 111(a) which states that each party could deploy two
limited ABM systems, one, to protect a party's capitol, the other, an
ICBM launch site.6 Notably, these limited sites allowed for only 100
ABM launchers and 100 ABM interceptors, with an additional provision
of six ABM radar complexes for the capitol site or, in the case of the
ICBM site, two "large phased-array ABM radars" and eighteen other
ABM radars of lesser sophistication.7 Equally noteworthy because it
3. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972,
U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435 [hereinafter ABM Treaty].
4. Warren P. Strobel, Official Offers Timetable on Quitting ABM Treaty, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 11, 2001, at A2; Anthony Cordesman, On-line interview, WASH. POST
ONLINE (May 3, 2000), at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srvliveonline /00/world/
cordesman050300.htm.
5. ABM Treaty, supra note 3, 23 U.S.T. at 3438.
6. Id. at 3440.
7. Id. See also Michael Krepon, Missile Defense: Not Such a Bad Idea, BULL. OF
THE ATOM. SCIENTISTS, May/June 1999, at 31 (noting that the 1974 Protocol halved the
allowance of interceptor missiles from 200 to 100).
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supplied the impetus for the so-called "Broad/Narrow" debate fifteen
years later, Article V, Section 1 explicitly forbade each party from
developing, testing, or deploying ABM systems or components which
are sea-based, air based, space-based, or mobile land-based. 8 Finally,
Article XV, Section 2 deserves mention, for it afforded each party the
opportunity to withdraw from the ABM Treaty if "extraordinary events"
related to the ABM Treaty have "jeopardized its supreme interests." 9 In
exercising Article XV, Section 2, the withdrawing party was required to
provide six months notice.'0 As will be discussed, President George W.
Bush exercised Article XV, Section 2 of the ABM Treaty on December
13, 2001, thereby allowing the United States to formally withdraw on
May 13, 2002 (as of publication, no official withdrawal has taken
place). 11
Until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the ABM Treaty
unquestionably bound both signatory nations. Despite such clarity,
however, interpretation of the ABM Treaty provoked fierce debate on
several occasions prior to 1991. This debate was most contentious in
1987, when Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, and Judge Abraham Sofaer, Legal Advisor to the
Department State under President Reagan, engaged in the so-called
"Broad/Narrow" debate, which concerned whether the ABM Treaty
banned the development and testing of space-based and other mobile-
type ABM components that were based on "other physical principles."'
' 2
Judge Soafer argued that the United States could comply with the Treaty
and do such testing. Senator Nunn disagreed.13 The Broad/Narrow
debate was of great significance to American national security, as it
would help outline National Missile Defense's legal and political
justification for years to come.
At the time of the debate, Senator Nunn argued that such development
and testing of components (known as the Reagan "reinterpretation")
would prove incompatible with the ABM Treaty's ratification hearings
before the Senate, as well as both the subsequent practice of the United
8. ABM Treaty, supra note 3, 23 U.S.T. at 3441.
9. Id. at 3446.
10. Id.
11. See Infra Part 11. B.
12. John Norton Moore, Frederick S. Tipson, and Robert F. Turner, NATIONAL
SECURITY LAW 598 (Carolina Academic Press ed. 1990).
13. Id.
States and U.S.S.R and the negotiating history. 14 In response, Judge
Sofaer offered a "broad" interpretation of the ABM Treaty, stating,
"When [the Senate] gives its advice and consent to a ABM Treaty, it is
to the ABM Treaty that was made, irrespective of the explanation it is
provided."' 5 Upset by Judge Sofaer's comments, the Senate rejected his
position in an amendment "attached to the resolution of ratification of
the INF Treaty in May 1988. ' 'I6
To date, the Broad/Narrow debate remains unresolved, and although
the official government position can be found in the authoritative report
authored by John Norton Moore, Director of the Center for National
Security Law, the report remains classified. Despite this, the
Broad/Narrow debate has significantly shaped American National
Missile Defense development, for, as will be explained, Congressional
resistance to President Reagan's "Star Wars System" not only
characterized spaced-based missile defense research as hawkish fantasy,
but also helped to establish a lasting impression of missile defense as an
expensive and unobtainable pursuit. Though such skepticism has often
failed to distinguish between the different forms of missile defense (e.g.
the more exotic Star Wars vs. the more practical NMD), it has continued
to serve as a political lightening rod in the larger missile defense debate.
B. Post-Cold War Legal Status of the ABM Treaty:
Interplay of International Law &
Constitutional Precedent
In 1991, the U.S.S.R disintegrated and its geographic territory evolved
into fifteen independent states, all of which were recognized by the
United States. Until December 13, 2001, when President George W.
Bush announced that the United States would withdraw from the ABM
Treaty following a six month notice period in accordance with Article
XV, section 2, American politicians and scholars had debated whether
the ABM Treaty remained valid-and thus, whether the United States'
missile defense efforts remained constrained--even though the Soviet
Union no longer existed. In general, most scholars agreed that until the
United States Senate consented to ratification, the ABM Treaty was
without legal effect. At the same time, however, these scholars believed
that customary international law (as stipulated by the provisions of
Article XVIII of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties)
14. Id. at 599 (citing 133 CONG. REC. S 6623-91 (daily ed., May 19, 1987) & 133
CONG REC. S 6809-31 (daily ed., May 20, 1987)).
15. id. (quoting ABM Treaty and the Constitution: Joint Hearing of the Senate
Foreign Relations and Judiciary Committees, 100th Cong. 1st Sess., Mar. 26, 1987 at
375 (testimony of Abraham Sofaer, Legal Advisor, Dep't of State)).
16. Id.
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prevented the United States from defeating the object and purpose of the
ABM Treaty.
Notably, both President George H. W. Bush and President Bill Clinton
expressed suport for retaining the ABM Treaty throughout their
presidencies.' Indeed, President George H. W. Bush proceeded under
the assumption that the ABM Treaty remained intact and never
submitted it to the Senate.18
Like his predecessor, President Clinton endorsed the notion that the
ABM Treaty would continue with Russia. Unlike President Bush,
however, President Clinton later added three other former Soviet
Republics as signatories in 1996-and argued that these three nations,
along with Russia-but not the eleven other former Soviet republics-
somehow constituted a direct succession from the Soviet Union, thereby
preserving the legal validity of the ABM Treaty and rendering
unnecessary Senatorial consent to ratification. Equally noteworthy, both
policy considerations and political concessions often obscured
discussion of the ABM Treaty's continuing legal merits.
Most scholars agree that Robert F. Turner, Associate Director for the
Center of National Security Law, offers the determinative interpretation
of the ABM Treaty's present legal status, in light of international law
and the ABM Treaty following the Cold War. Professor Turner applies
the "clean slate" principle of international law, which dictates, "when
one country has a bilateral ABM Treaty with another and is then
'succeeded' by a different state.... the bilateral ABM Treaty remains in
effect only if both states so affirm-the new state and its predecessor's
treaty partner." 19  According to this principal, the fifteen new
independent states began their existence with a "clean slate" with respect
to any rights and obligations from Soviet treaties, unless those states,
along with any ABM Treaty partners, choose to undertake any
obligations that had burdened the Soviet Union.20 Likewise, as noted by
17. Robert F. Turner, Prepared Testimony of Robert F. Turner before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, FED. NEWS SERVICE, July 24, 2001 (on file with author).
18. E.g., Michael J. Glennon, Yes, there is an ABM Treaty, WASH. POST, Sept. 4,
2000, at A25 (noting that Secretary of State James Baker stated on Jan. 29, 1992, "the
United States remains committed to the ABM Treaty .... [W]e expect the states of the
commonwealth to abide by all of the international treaties and obligations that were
entered into by the former Soviet Union, including the ABM Treaty.").
19. R. James Woolsey, What ABM Treaty?, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 2000, at A23
(noting that for "dispositive treaties, such as those which dispose of territory," succession
is automatic, though such a principal is inapplicable to the ABM Treaty).
20. David M. Ackerman & Amy F. Woolf, ABM Treaty: Legal Status and
former CIA Director R. James Woolsey: Russia (or all/some group of
the former Soviet republics) had succeeded to the rights and duties of the
ABM Treaty only if both Russia and the United States affirmed, for
establishing a new ABM Treaty partner(s) constitutes a major revision of
the original ABM Treaty. 21 According to the Heritage Foundation, even
President Clinton, in a November 21, 1997 letter ("1997 Letter") to the
Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Representative Benjamin
Gilman (R-NY), acknowledged that recognizing Russia as the "legal
partner" of the ABM Treaty would have required fundamental changes
in the ABM Treaty.
Other commentators have argued that the ABM Treaty was vitiated by
fall of the Soviet Union in 1991:
[T]here is no state, or group of states-including the Russian Federation-that
can both be said to have continued the Soviet Union's international legal
personality (its sovereignty) and that also is capable of implementing the totality
of the U.S.S.R.'s obligations under the ABM Treaty in accordance with that
agreement's original terms, that treaty was discharged il a matter of law in
1991 and the United States is not now legally bound by it.
In their analysis, Rivkin and Casey emphasize the dicta in Terlinden v.
Ames, where the Court observed that a bilateral treaty, such as the ABM
Treaty, can only survive the collapse of a nation when that nation is
followed by a succeeding nation and when that succeeding nation
inherits the former nation's a) international legal personality, b)
sovereignty, and c) unimpaired power to execute the bilateral Treaty. 24
Withdrawal, in Missile Defense: The Current Debate, a report prepared by the
Congressional Research Service, Sept. 28, 2001, at 11 (Steven A. Hildreth & Amy F.
Woolf eds).
21. See Woolsey, supra note 19, at A23; see also Michael Doyle, Missile Defense
Debate Raises Questions About ABM Treaty with Soviet Union, FRESNO BEE, Sept. 7,
2000, at B8 (quoting Professor Turner as stating, "treaties like the ABM Treaty do not
automatically continue in force in settings of state succession, and there is a presumption
that they expire unless the parties agree to keep them in force.").
22. Letter from William J. Clinton to Benjamin A. Gilman 34 (Nov. 21, 1997),
cited in David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, The Legal Status of the ABM Treaty,
Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, May 25,
1999, at n.3, available at http://www.heritage.orglfeatures/rivkintest052599.html. The
President declared, "[n]either a simple recognition of Russia as the sole ABM successor
nor a simple recognition of all NIS states as full ABM successors would have preserved
fully the original substance and purpose of the ABM Treaty as approved by the Senate in
1972."
23. See Rivkin & Casey, supra note 22.
24. Id. at n.6 (citing Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 283 (1902) (dicta). The
court states:
undoubtedly treaties may be terminated by the absorption of Powers in other
Nationalities and the loss of separate existence, as in the case of Hanover and
Nassau, which became by conquest incorporated into the Kingdom of Prussia
in 1866. Cessation of independent existence rendered the execution of treaties
impossible. But where sovereignty in that respect is not extinguished, and the
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To illustrate how the Terlinden reasoning applies to the collapse of the
Soviet Union, Rivkin and Casey hypothetically propose a scenario where
the French colonial empire has not only dissolved over the past fifty
years, but France itself has disintegrated into its ancient kingdoms,
principalities, and provinces, i.e., Normandy, Brittany, Anjou, and so
forth. 5 Would Normandy alone be considered a valid successor of
France?26 The answer is no in light of the Court's observations in
Tenderlin. Following such reasoning, the ABM Treaty cannot survive
because no succeeding state(s) has inherited the former Soviet Union's
international legal personality, nor can any of the states execute the
ABM Treaty in accordance with its original terms.27 More precisely,
none of the former Soviet republics has agreed to accept the ABM
obligations without alteration, and even if any of the successor states did
agree to the terms of the ABM Treaty it "would so fundamentally
change the bargain approved by the Senate when it consented to the
ABM Treaty's ratification, that its consent would have to be obtained
again" - which has yet to occur.28 In short, the Executive and Senate
contemplated one treaty partner (the Soviet Union) when it agreed to the
ABM Treaty; to add signatory states to the ABM Treaty which were not
even in existence at the time of execution essentially eviscerates the
effect of the Treaty.
Though the consensus of international law commentators was that the
ABM Treaty did not survive the collapse of the Soviet Union, President
Clinton preferred a different interpretation. In his view, the ABM Treaty
remained in effect following the Soviet Union's collapse due to a 1978
convention that limits the application of the clean slate rule "solely to
,,29
countries emerging from colonial domination. Neither the United
States nor the Soviet Union (or Russia), however, is a party to this
convention-nor are ninety percent of the world's countries (thus
diffusing any possible "customary law" argument).3°
power to execute remains unimpaired, outstanding treaties cannot be regarded





29. See Woolsey, supra note 19, at A23.
30. John Norton Moore, Director, Center for National Security Law, Lecture on
International Law at the University of Virginia School of Law (Sept. 4, 2001) (citing
Oscar Shafter and three ways for the ABM Treaty to be accepted as customary
international law: where ABM Treaty rule is declaratory on previous custom (not
United States constitutional law also proves significant in this debate.
Article II, Section 2 of the United States Constitution instructs that
modifications to an existing treaty be treated as the creation of a separate
treaty, thus, which must be submitted to the Senate for its advice and
consent.31 According to Professor Turner, the Framers' intent in Article
II, Section 2 of the Constitution was clear: "[iut is well established
[practice] ... that any effort by the Executive Branch to change the
terms of a treaty constitutes the making of a new treaty and requires the
consent of two-thirds of the Senate before it may be ratified."' 2 While
President Clinton made clear in the 1997 Letter that the "original
substance and purpose" of the ABM Treaty had been altered by
dissolution of the Soviet Union, he refused to seek the advice and
consent of the Senate, as required by the U.S. Constitution.33
Perhaps even more remarkable than his attempt to preserve the ABM
Treaty without Senatorial consent, President Clinton also attempted to
transform the ABM Treaty from a bilateral to a multilateral agreement-
also without advice and consent. Specifically, on September 26, 1997,
he authorized Secretary of State Madeline Albright to sign the
"Memorandum of Understanding on Succession" (MOU).34 The MOU
was a unilateral amendment purporting to expand the number of ABM
Treaty signatories from two to five, by adding Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and
applicable to 1978 convention); where ABM Treaty rule is found to crystallize
customary international law (not applicable if ninty percent of nations refuse to sign);
where ABM Treaty rule creates new customary international law as the ABM Treaty
becomes accepted over time (not applicable if ninty percent of nations refuse to sign))
(on file with author). See also Woolsey, supra note 19, at A23.
31. Baker Spring, President Clinton's Contradictory Policy on the ABM Treaty,
HERITAGE FOUND. EXECUTIVE MEMORANDUM No. 534, June 16, 1998, at 2, available at
http://www.heritage.org/library/execmemo/em534.html.
32. See Turner, supra note 17.
33. But see Glennon, supra note 18. Professor Michael J. Glennon of the
University of California at Davis, citing a congressional law passed in 1996 that required
any modifications of the ABM Treaty negotiated by the President to be submitted to the
Senate for advice and consent, argues, "it would have made no sense to prohibit the
president from modifying an agreement that did not exist; Congress must have believed
the ABM Treaty to be in effect in 1996, or it would have had no reason to limit
presidential power to amend it."; cf Ian Christopher McCaleb, GOP Lawmakers
Threaten Suit over Missiles, U.P.I., July 10, 1996, at I (arguing Professor Glennon,
ignoring the fact that Congress passed the legislation both out of frustration of President
Clinton's refusal to submit the ABM Treaty to the Senate, and as a less divisive
substitute for suing the President on grounds of deliberately failing to adhere to a theater
missile defense deployment schedule, as Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ) and Congressman Curt
Weldon (R-PA) alleged).
34. See Memorandum of Understanding Relating to the Treaty Between the United
States of American and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of
Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972 (Septemeber 26, 1997), available at
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/acda/abmmou.htm.
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Belarus-apparently giving new meaning to the word "bilateral. 35
Even the independent, non-partisan Congressional Research Service
concluded that while the MOU should have been submitted to the Senate
for advice and consent, "the Clinton Administration did not do so before
it left office, because it feared it would be defeated. 36  Likewise,
Professor Turner highlights Article IX of the MOU, which dictates that
the MOU could have become enforceable only upon the constitutionally
mandated processes for treaty approval within the five nations."
Therefore, by refusing to submit the MOU to the Senate for consent,
President Clinton only ensured that the MOU could not be ratified.
Further mistaking his interpretation of international law, President
Clinton authored a letter dated May 21, 1998, to both the Chairman of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Jessie Helms (R-NC)
and to Representative Gilman ("1998 Letter"), and argued that "the
United States and Russia clearly are parties to the ABM Treaty ' 38 even
though in the 1997 Letter, he claimed that such a conclusion would have
required changes to the "substance and purpose" of the ABM Treaty.39
To make matters more confusing, the Clinton State Department
continued to list the Soviet Union as the United States' bilateral ABM
Treaty partner in all of its versions of "Treaties in Force. 4 °  Not
surprisingly, President Clinton left office in 2001 without ever having
submitted to the Senate the successor to the ABM Treaty. Even this
final point deserves mention, for on May 14, 1997, in exchange for
Senator Jessie Helms allowing the Conventional Forces in Europe Flank
Document to go to the Senate Floor for a vote on ratification, President
Clinton agreed-in writing-that he would submit the ABM protocols to
the Senate.4 '
35. Id.
36. See Ackerman & Woolf, supra note 20, at 12.
37. Robert F. Turner, Associate Director, Center for National Security Law,
Presentation on ABM's Legal Status at New England School of Law's International Law
Forum (Nov. 8, 2001) (on file with author).
38. Letter from William J. Clinton to Benjamin A. Gilman (May 21, 1998), quoted
in Rivkin & Casey, supra note 22, at n.3.
39. See Spring, supra note 31, at 2.
40. U.S. Department of State, Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other
International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 1998, 290 (1998)
[hereinafter Treaties in Force], available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/legal-
affairs/tifindex.html.
41. Jesse Helms, Amend the ABM Treaty?, WALL ST. J., January 22, 1999, at A10.
Presuming for a moment that both the ABM Treaty and the MOU
were legitimate, any future changes in the ABM Treaty would have
required the signatures of five nations, rather than two.42 Consequently,
as discussed by Professor Turner, the United States would no longer
have comprised fifty percent of the ABM Treaty's Standing Consulting
Commission. Instead, it could have constituted only twenty percent of
the Commission, with four former Soviet Republics comprising the
other eighty percent.43 Moreover, as noted by Director Woolsey,
requiring five signatures would have endangered American security. For
example, Belarus "is ruled by the dictatorial and highly corrupt
Lukashenko regime that is in league with the most unreconstructured
parts of the old Soviet military-industrial complex." 44 Therefore, even
though President Clinton's 1997 Letter interpreted Russia's succession
of the Soviet Union as a "substantive" change, the 1998 Letter implicitly
regarded a new nuclear defense alliance with Alexander Lukashenko as
non-substantive.45 Perhaps this contradiction clarifies why President
Clinton failed to send the revised ABM Treaty to the Senate for their
advice and consent.
There are numerous other reasons why the current version of the ABM
Treaty is illegal under United States law absent the advice and consent
of the Senate. For instance, the area covered by the Clinton version of
the ABM Treaty would have been 5.5 million square kilometers smaller
than the area covered by the ABM Treaty that received consent by the
Senate in 1972.46 Such a territorial distinction significantly impacts
national security, as 5.5 million square kilometers of former Soviet
topography would have become available to host advanced missile
defense systems.47
A number of key provisions were linked to the protection of key cities.
For example Article III stipulated that Moscow and Washington D.C.
could be protected.48 Would that protection under Article III now extend
to Odessa or Kiev? In order to ensure the United States preserved the
benefits of the original bargain, Article III would have required
redrafting if any other party were to undertake the Soviet Union's ABM
42. See Charles Krauthammer, The Bush Doctrine, WKLY. STANDARD, June 4,
2001, at 23 (noting that the ABM treaty is "a relic of the bipolar world).
43. See Turner, supra note 37.
44. See Woolsey, supra note 19, at A32.
45. Id.
46. Id. (noting that eleven countries that had been part of the Soviet Union would
be excluded under the Clinton version-the Baltics, The Caucasus, Moldova,
Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan).
47. See Turner, supra note 37.
48. ABM Treaty, supra note 3, 23 U.S.T. at 3446.
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Treaty obligations.49
Until December 13, 2001, there was no determinative official United
States' position on the ABM Treaty's legal status: the State Department
had classified the ABM Treaty as "under review."5 ° As we have seen,
President Clinton's combination of unilateral maneuvers and conflicting
comments only muddied the issue. One commentator suggests that
President's Clinton's apparent aim "was to make the ABM Treaty more
enduring, at a time when it had already become obsolete. 51 Indeed,
prior to December 13, 2001, the most tenable position was that until the
ABM Treaty was submitted to the Senate for advice and consent, there
could not have existed an identified ABM Treaty partner. Therefore, the
ABM Treaty had lapsed and was no longer legally binding upon the
United States. At the same time, some commentators maintained that
customary international law (as stipulated by Article XVIII of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) bound the United States to
not defeat the object and purpose of the ABM Treaty until the Senate
had the opportunity to ratify.
On December 13, 2001, President George W. Bush heeded the advice
of Professor Turner and others and settled the ABM Treaty's unsettled
legal status. By doing so, he paved the way for missile defense systems.
Specifically, President Bush exercised Article XV, Section 2, and clearly
identified three grounds for withdrawal: that new threats from rogue
states constitute "extraordinary events;" that such threats could not have
been contemplated in 1972; and, therefore, that the ABM Treaty
"hinders our government's ability to develop ways to protect our people
,,53
from future terrorist or rogue-state missile attacks. Consequently, the
United States has provided Russia with six months notice of its intent to
withdraw (as stipulated in Article XV, Section 2), thus ensuring that the
clock on the ABM Treaty will strike midnight on May 13, 2002.
49. See Rivkin and Casey, supra note 22.
50. See Treaties in Force, supra note 40.
51. See e.g., Krauthammer, supra note 42, at 23.
52. See generally Turner, supra note 37.
53. See Remarks Announcing the United States Withdrawal From the Anti-Balistic
Missile Treaty, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1783 (Dec. 13, 2001), available at
www.access.gpo.gov/nara/v37no50.html. See also Steven Mufson & Dana Milbank,
U.S. Sets Missile ABM Treaty Pullout, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2001, at A01.
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C. The ABM Treaty & President George W. Bush:
The United States Will Likely No Longer Be A Party To The
Treaty After May 13, 2002
Shortly after taking office, President Bush made clear his intentions to
create national missile defense (NMD), irrespective of the ABM Treaty;
though he had pledged to first find a "cooperative solution" with Russia.
Indeed, one may postulate that the clock on the ABM Treaty began
ticking the day President Bush was sworn into office because the Bush
Administration planned missile tests for Spring 2002 that, until the
President's historic announcement on December 13, 2001, would have
clearly violated the ABM Treaty. 54 The President's candor on this issue
was best illustrated by his comments in a press conference at the June
13, 2001 NATO Summit, when he told world leaders, "[b]efore we can
lay out a specific case [for the creation of NMD,] ... it's necessary to
set aside the ABM Treaty so we can fully explore all options available to
the United States and our allies and friends. The ABM Treaty prevents
full exploration of opportunity., 55  Likewise, before December 13,
President Bush refused to promise to submit any actions on the ABM
Treaty to the Senate for advice and consent. Instead he pledged only
that he would "consult" with Congress on the matter.56  As will be
discussed later in greater detail, President Bush believes firmly that the
ABM Treaty "is a product of the Cold War era" (i.e. mutually assured
destruction), and with the increased threat presented by nuclear
proliferation and the rise of the rogue nation nuclear threat, the United
States must begin immediate work on deployment of NMD.57
President Bush's blunt intention to withdraw from the ABM Treaty
prompted sharp rebuke from both foreign leaders and domestic
competitors. For instance, French President Jacques Chirac chastised
the President for "lightly discarding" the ABM Treaty, as Chirac
54. See Strobel, supra note 4. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz told
the Senate Armed Services Committee in July 2001 that the "testing program could
come into conflict with the ABM Treaty as early as February, when tests of antimissile
and air defense radars are planned." See also Barry Schweid, State Notifies U.S. of
Missile Plans, A.P. ONLINE, July 12, 2001, at AI5, available at 2001 WL 24711216.
Also, in July, the State Department "notified its diplomats around the world that the tests
will come in conflict with that 1972 ABM Treaty with Moscow in months." Id.
55. Joseph Curl, Bush wants ABM Treaty to be 'set aside', WASH. TIMES, June 14,
2001, at Al (emphasis added).
56. See Steven A. Hildreth, Budget Allocation and Program Restructuring, in
Missile Defense: The Current Debate, a report prepared by the Congressional Research
Service, Sept. 28, 2001, at 14 (Steven A. Hildreth & Amy F. Woolf eds) (outlining
President Bush's NMD budget requests). Part of this consultation no doubt includes
negotiating with Congress for NMD appropriations.
57. See Curl, supra note 55, at AI.
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believed the Treaty was an indispensable part of global security.
58
Likewise, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fisher warned that should
the United States no longer recognize the ABM Treat, "it must be
replaced only by better ones or more effective ones. Finally, one
senior European diplomat lamented, "[i]f Bush has already decided to go
ahead with breaking the ABM Treaty and building his project, then how
are we supposed to believe that these consultations have any
meaning?" 6°
Similarly, several American politicians have criticized the President
for acting on the ABM Treaty without first consulting with the Senate-
a charge eerily familiar to that leveled against President Clinton. For
instance, Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-MI) criticized the
President's unilateral decision to withdraw from the treaty: "I think we
are isolating ourselves, and in so isolating ourselves, I think we're
minimizing ourselves. I don't think we are taken as seriously today as
we were a few years ago.' Along these lines, both Senator Joseph
Biden (D-DE) and Senator Carl Levin (D-MI), Co-Chairmen of the
Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, respectively,
indicated they would back the President's proposal to withdraw from the
Treaty only if he did not act unilaterally.
62
To illustrate this opposition, on September 7, 2001, the Senate Armed
Services Committee passed legislation that would have reduced
spending on U.S. missile defense programs by $1.3 billion, and would
have required President Bush gain congressional approval either before
expending funds on NMD that could violate the ABM Treaty, or before
attempting to withdraw from the ABM Treaty.63
The domestic criticism of President Bush's NMD policy may have
reached its apex on the very day he formally announced the United
58. William Drozdiak & Dana Milbank, Bush Tries to Sell NATO on Missile
Defense Plan, WASH. POST, June 14, 2001, at A01.
59. Mark Thompson, The Secretary of Missile Defense, TIMEMAG., May 14, 2001, at 28.
60. See Drozdiak and Milbank, supra note 58.
61. Joseph Curl, Key Democrats back ending ABM, WASH. TIMES, July 26, 2001, at 1.
62. Id.; see also Ivo H. Daalder, Online Interview with Washington Post Online, at
I (May 2, 2001) available at http://www.washingtonpost.comwp-srv/iiveonline/0l/world/
worlddaalder050201 .htm. Ivo H. Daalder, a Senior Fellow of Foreign Policy Studies at
the Brookings Institute, argues that the President is "abandoning a core piece of
international law" and defining the interests of world peace all by itself by setting aside
the ABM Treaty." Id.
63. John Whitesides, Senate Panel Cuts Missile Defense Budget, REUTERS, Sept. 7,
2001.
States' intent to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. In fact, only hours
after President Bush's historic declaration on December 13, 2001,
Senator Robert C. Byrd compared President Bush to a king because by
withdrawing from the ABM Treaty without the Senate's consent, he
"effectively undermines the intent of the framers of our Constitution.
Monarchs make treaties; presidents propose treaties.
64
From the standpoint of international law, Senator Byrd's comments
were incorrect for at least three reasons. First, the President does not
need the consent of the Senate to withdraw from a treaty. In Goldwater
v. Carter,65 Justice Brennan's dissent concluded that President Jimmy
Carter had the constitutional right to withdraw from the 1954 Taiwanese
Mutual Defense Treaty without the consent of the Senate, emphasizing,
"the President's well-established authority to recognize, and withdraw
recognition from foreign governments. 66
Second, presidents do more than just, in the words of Senator Byrd,
"propose treaties." For example, as stipulated by Article II, Section 2,
Clause 2 of the United States Constitution, the Senate, with a 2/3
majority, provides the President with its advice and consent to
ratification. However, the President-not the Senate- elects whether
to ratify a treaty. It is possible for the President to submit a treaty to the
Senate for consent to ratification; for the Senate then to consent to the
treaty's ratification; for the Senate then to return the treaty with the
Senate's consent to the President; and for the President then to decide
not to ratify the treaty. Therefore, if we employ Senator Byrd's flawed
logic, presidents are monarchs because they do make treaties.
Third, though Senator Byrd believes that President Bush has,
"undermined the intent of the Framers of our Constitution," the actual
words of the Framers strongly suggest that they intended for the
President to have tremendous powers in foreign affairs. In addition, the
first President, Chief Justice, and Congress all believed that the president
should play the predominant role in foreign affairs.67 Textually, Article
II, Section I makes clear that the "Executive Power shall be vested in a
President."
68
Despite the inaccurate legal arguments proffered by some in Congress,
President Bush has nevertheless received enthusiastic support from
64. Mufson & Milbank, supra note 53, at A40.
65. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
66. Id. at 1006. In Goldwater, the majority of the Supreme Court dismissed the
complaint as they viewed the Taiwan treaty question as a not justiciable political
question. Id. at 996-1005.
67. John Norton Moore, Director, Center for National Security Law, Lecture on
International Law at the University of Virginia School of Law (Sept. 24, 2001) (on file
with author).
68. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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numerous members of Congress and from foreign leaders regarding his
decision to opt out of the ABM Treaty. Generally, these officials have
emphasized that while the United States should first seek to establish a
"cooperation solution" with Russia, the United States properly maintains
the right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty to proceed with NMD.69
Several influential Republican members of Congress have provided
unequivocal support for the President. For example, Senator John
Warner (R-VA) recently stressed, "the ABM Treaty has outlived its
purposes[,], 70 and even led a failed effort to regain $1 billion of the $1.3
billion that the Senate Democrats rescinded on NMD spending.
7
'
Similarly, Senator Jeff Sessions (R-AL) has emphasized that by forcing
the President to gain approval from the Senate on either ABM Treaty
issues or NMD spending, the Senate has only "complicated the
President's ability to negotiate. '72
Foreign leaders have also buttressed President Bush's NMD efforts by
recognizing both that the ABM Treaty has outlived its purposes, and that
NMD works to the advantage of the entire global community. For
instance, Jack Straw, the British Foreign Secretary, recently noted, "the
world has changed in 30 years... there has been a development of
weapons of mass destruction by third countries. 73 Likewise, leaders
from Hungry, Italy, Poland, and Spain have all voiced approval for
NMD.74
Although the debate concerning the ABM Treaty remains contentious,
the United States can formally withdraw from the Treaty on May 13,
2002. By authorizing the United States to take such action, President
Bush will render mute those who persist in venerating an outlived treaty
based on antiquated logic. Indeed, President Bush began his
administration with a crystal clear approach to the ABM Treaty-that it
would not preclude NMD-and, since that time, has only cultivated it to
one of unprecedented conviction. By doing so, President Bush has
69. See, e.g., Ackerman & Woolf, supra note 20, at 11. "Deputy Secretary
Wolfowitz has said frequently during testimony on Capital Hill that the United States
would not violate the ABM Treaty."; see also Curl, supra note 61, at 1. Dr. Condoleezza
Rice, National Security Advisor to the President, emphasized that the ABM Treaty
"prevents us from carrying out research, development, testing and evaluation of
defensive technologies." Id.
70. Curl, supra note 61, at Al
71. See Whitesides, supra note 63.
72. Id.
73. See Schweid, supra note 54.
74. See Drozdiak & Milbank, supra note 58, at Al.
illustrated an essential principal of governance voiced by Dr. Rice:
"choose goals that are optimal, even if they seem at the time politically
infeasible."
'75
II. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS:
PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE
A. Earlier Attempts
Following the Senate's consent to ratification of the ABM Treaty in
1972, the United States has remained engaged in the development of
national missile defenses. Indeed, the United States has already taken
advantage of explicit opportunities for missile defense systems provided
by the ABM Treaty.
1. Safeguard System
As noted earlier, Article III of the ABM Treaty permitted both the
U.S. and the Soviet Union to deploy two limited missile defense
systems, one to defend the capitol city, the other to defend an ICBM
field. 6 The Soviet Union was first to capitalize on Article II, having
already constructed the "Galosh" ABM system around Moscow by the
late 1960s. Primitive by modern missile defense standards, Galosh
contained sixty-four long-range nuclear-armed high-altitude interceptors
supported by two large surveillance radars and twenty-four scanning
radars to guide the interceptors.77
Conversely, while the Soviets erected a missile defense system around
Moscow to protect its regime elites, the United States constructed its
missile defense system far away from its national leaders. On March 14,
1969, President Richard M. Nixon publicly announced his intent that the
Pentagon begin developing a system to "protect our land-based
retaliatory forces against a direct attack by the Soviet Union;...
[defend] the American people against the kind of nuclear attack which
Communist China is likely to be able to mount within the decade; [and
protect] against the possibility of accidental launches from any
source." From that point in time, the Department of Defense
developed the "Safeguard" system at Grand Forks Air Force Base in
75. John Barry, Looking Forward to NMD: America will definitely build a
national missile defense. Here's why-and what it means, NEWSWEEK ONLINE, Jan. 29,
2001, available at http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/papers/2001/01 -F12.shtml.
76. GORDON R. MITCHELL, STRATEGIC DECEPTION: RHETORIC, SCIENCE, AND
POLITICS IN MISSILE DEFENSE ADVOCACY 9 (2000).
77. George Lewis and Theodore Postol, Portrait of a bad idea, BULL. OF ATOM.
SCIENTISTS, July/August 1997, at 18.
78. Office of the Secretary of Defense, FY 73 Safeguard Rationale, at 2 (Feb. 27,
1972), at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB36/04-01 .htm.
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Nekoma, North Dakota. Safegaurd was designed as a missile defense
system to protect the Base's 150 Minuteman missiles.
Recently, declassified documents, however, confirm that by 1972,
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird had sought vigorously to persuade
President Nixon to pursue a second site around Washington D.C. that
would have, according to Secretary Laird, provided the President with
"additional valuable time for decision-making., 79 Although President
Nixon was receptive to the notion of a second site around Washington
D.C., Congress refused to fund such a program in 1974.80 The refusal of
Congress to fund a second site prompted President Nixon to seek an
agreement with the Soviet Union on limiting each parties ABM capacity
to one site. Both nations agreed to this amendment to the ABM Treaty
on July 3, 1974.81
On October 1, 1975, Safeguard became operational.82 From research
and development to operational implementation, the total cost of
Safeguard was $25 billion.83 Significantly, although Pentagon officials
believed that Safeguard could preserve a portion of the nation's nuclear
arsenal in the event of a Soviet first-strike, recently declassified
documents reveal that those same officials privately conceded, "even
four Safeguard sites might not be enough to counter a mass attack by
advanced Soviet ICBMs." 84 Simply put, Safeguard was a very limited
system, though it did offer a first step towards utilizing missile defense,
both to deter a Soviet first-strike, and to protect against an accidental or
unauthorized launch.
Despite the initial promise offered by Safeguard, its technology, like
that supporting the Galosh, became obsolete as the superpowers altered
their nuclear arsenal in response to the SALT I Treaty. Specifically,
79. See Id. at 8 & 10. In the document, Secretary Laird notes that subsequent to
initial deployment of Washington D.C. defenses planned for early 1979, "[a] Safeguard
site at Washington under an arms control agreement permitting ABM defenses of
national capitals might need to provide for a 'reinforced' deployment of 3-4 radars
deployed by late 1979". Id. at 10.
80. William Burr, Missile Defense Thirty Years Ago: Dgji vu All Over Again?,
NAT'L. SECURITY ARCHIVE, at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB36/
(last visited Feb. 20, 2002).
81. Daniel Smith (Colonel, US Army, retired), Chronology of US Missile Defense
Programs, Center for Defense Information, available at http://www.cdi.org/hotspots/
issuebrief/ch9/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2002)
82. See Mitchell, supra note 76, at 9.
83. See Thompson, supra note 59, at 23.
84. Office of the Secretary of Defense, supra note 78, at 8 & 9.
soon after the parties agreed to SALT I's limitation on each side's
number of ICBMs (rather than the number of warheads), the
superpowers began to place multiple warheads atop their ICBMs (a.k.a.
"mirving") as a way to preserve their destructive capacity. For instance,
"the number of U.S. ballistic missile-delivered warheads grew from
roughly 1,700 in 1968 to roughly 8,500 in 1986. "85 During that same
time period, the Soviets developed the SS-18 force, a nuclear arsenal
consisting of more than 300 highly accurate missiles, each containing 10
warheads-a force theoretically powerful enough to destroy all
American ICBMs.86
As a result of mirving, neither Safeguard nor Galosh presented a
useful defense against a missile attack, for neither would be able to
defend against a series of mirved missile attacks. In addition, Safeguard
was plagued by large "easy to destroy" radars that would have been
particularly vulnerable during an attack.
87
On the other hand, advocates of Safeguard noted that while it would
have failed to effectively defend against a mirved attack, its capacities
would have been improved over time, provided it received adequate
support. Instead of attempting to improve Safeguard, however,
Congress elected to sever its funding entirely in the 1976 budget process.
On October 2, 1975--only one day after Safeguard became
operational-the House of Representatives elected to eliminate
Safeguard's $85 million budget, ordering that the Grand Forks site be
"completely torn down." By November 1975, the Senate concurred with
the House of Representatives and sought the elimination of the nation's
only defense against nuclear missiles. Specifically, Senator Edward M.
Kennedy (D-MA) authored an amendment in the 1976 budget process
stipulating that all ABM funding was to be "used only for the purpose of
the expeditious termination and deactivation of all operations at
[Safeguard]. 88  More bluntly, Senator Kennedy believed that his
amendment "require[s] that the facility at Grand Forks would effectively




Some critics found the mothballing of Safeguard undesirable because
the mothballing process might not "[protect] the technical expertise in
the ABM area that is considered a national asset." 90 By refraining from
85. See Lewis and Postol, supra note 77, at 19.
86. Charles S. Robb, Star Wars II, WASH. Q., Winter 1999, at 81.
87. George C. Wilson, U.S. Continuing Search for Missile Defense, WASH. POST.
Dec. 19, 1979, at A3.
88. Staff Writer, Army Widens Ballistic Missile Research, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., Dec. 8, 1975, at 17.
89. Id. at 18.
90. Id.
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NMD development, the United States effectively precluded scientific
research on defenses that could have saved tens of millions of lives if the
nation was ever attacked either deliberately or accidentally.
Equally significant, as argued most vehemently by Secretary of
Defense James R. Schlesinger, the Senate's actions essentially conferred
a benefit to the Soviets without receiving any return benefit as its
amendment enabled the Soviets to continue their development of NMD
technology while "relinquishing our ABM posture without attempting to
extract any concession from the Soviets."9 ' Not surprisingly, one senior
Defense Department official lamented, "the Soviets must be laughing u
their sleeves at what we are doing to ourselves in the name of detente."
'2
Some in the Department of Defense argued that the dismantling of
Safeguard weakened U.S. posture in negotiating with the Soviets.9 At
about the same time, newly appointed Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld was forced by Congress to order Safeguard shut down.94 All
the while, the Soviets preserved Galosh and later expanded it to the more
sophisticated "Gazelle" System which remains operational today.
2. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
Eight years after Secretary Rumsfeld was forced to place Safeguard in
"caretaker" status, President Reagan announced that the United States
would begin work on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). SDI was a
complex mostly abstract notion of space-based technology that would
one day employ lasers in outer space to destroy nuclear missiles. In fact,
during his address, President Reagan openly acknowledged SDI's
enormous technological challenge: "I know this is a formidable technical
task, one that may not be accomplished before the end of the century."
95
Nevertheless, the initial promise of SDI was evident in the early 1980s,
when a team of scientists led by Dr. Edward Teller of the Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory developed the nuclear-pumped x-ray
laser. The x-ray laser was a technological landmark signifying a first
step towards the creation of short-wavelength atomic transitions that
91. Cecil Brownlow, Senate Unit Urged to Restore DOD Cuts, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., Oct. 20, 1975, at 18.
92. Clarence A. Robinson, Minutemen Production Defended, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., Jan. 19, 1976, at 12.
93. Id. (citing Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger).
94. Thompson, supra note 59, at 23.
95. See President's Speech on Military Spending and a New Defense, supra note 1,
at A20.
96could be used to explode nuclear missiles in outer space.
Unlike either the relatively modest Safeguard or even modem
conceptions of missile defense, SDI was designed to defend against a
massive nuclear onslaught. Because of its seemingly exotic capabilities,
SDI peTlexed even some of President Reagan's most hawkish
advisors. 
7
Almost twenty years later, SDI remains only a vision, for its requisite
technology has proven frustratingly elusive. In addition, over $25
billion has been spent on its development, though funding has declined
precipitously over the past decade.98 NMD borrows from the knowledge
obtained during the development of SDI research. For example, by 1992
SDI scientists had shifted much of the research from space-based lasers
to land-based missiles, renaming the project "Brilliant Pebbles." The
goal of Brilliant Pebbles was to acquire the technology whereby "100
ground-based missiles could have been deployed at a single site by
1996." 99 As we will now see, however, President Clinton had other
plans for missile defense.
3. The Clinton NMD "Pursuit"
Essentially, President Clinton avoided NMD until it became politically
impossible to do so. Although he promised in his 1996 State of the
Union Address to work towards a world where "not a single Russian
missile is pointed at America's children" and where North Korea has
"frozen its dangerous nuclear weapons," his actions painted an
unmistakably different picture of American deterrence 00 In fact, a
number of key events demonstrate how his symbolic, if not token
gestures at building NMD have likely resulted in delaying its
deployment by as many as five years.
First, as mentioned, in 1995, President Clinton, reasoning that no
present threat justified NMD deployment, vetoed legislation that would
have mandated the deployment of a limited national missile defense
96. David Voss, The War over Star Wars: Scientists vs. Zealots, PHOTONICS SPECTRA,
Apr. 1992, at 62.
97. See e.g., R. Jeffrey Smith, SDI Plan Draws Military Critics, WASH. POST, June
28, 1987, at A4 (noting that senior Army, Navy, and Air Force Joint Chiefs of Staff
officials privately discouraged President Reagan from seeking SDI because, in their
opinion, it was too complicated to create); George P. Shultz, From Turmoil and
Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State, published as a special book excerpt, May 10,
1993. Secretary of State George P. Schultz privately acknowledged to President Reagan
before his address, "we don't have the technology to do this."
98. Dan Charles, Unhappy birthday for Star Wars, NEW SCIENTIST, Mar. 28, 1992,
at 13.
99. Id.
100. Curt Weldon, An Urgent Need for a Strong Missile Defense, USA TODAY MAG.,
May 1997, at 12.
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system by 2003. Notably, as pointed out by Anthony Cordesman,
Senior Fellow for Strategic Assessment at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies and former advisor to President Reagan, a focus
limited to "present threats" myopically ignores possible threats over the
course of the next five to ten years.
101
By 1996, however, President Clinton shifted his position on NMD
primarily due to political considerations. After realizing that a large
number of Republicans and Democrats in Congress would have
overridden another veto of the same legislation, President Clinton
announced the "3+3" compromise program, which stipulated that if no
threat justified deployment after three years, then "development would
continue so that the system would always be three years from
deployment with up-to-date technology."' 0 2  Essentially, President
Clinton assumed that the United States would always have three years of
warning before a country would have the capacity to launch a missile at
the United States. President Clinton's three year assumption was not
only proven wrong by North Korea, but, more importantly, it ignored the
importance of extended deterrence-that is, President Clinton based his
decision based on expected threats to the United States, not on allies as
well. Notably, even NMD opponents, such as Dr. Lisbeth Gronlund and
Dr. David Wright, Research Fellows at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology's Security Studies Program, believe that the real purpose
behind the 3+3 program was not so much policy as it was, "designed to
undercut the Republican bid to require deployment by 2003 .'',3
Prior to 1998, the presence of the ABM Treaty (and President
Clinton's unyielding belief in it) acutely restrained any actions towards
development of NMD. As noted by Samuel Berger, Clinton's National
Security Advisor, the Clinton Administration "remain[ed] strongly
committed to the 1972 ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of our security.'
The practical effect of President Clinton's allegiance to the ABM Treaty,
however, meant that deploying even the most limited missile defense
would have required permission from Russia to revise the ABM Treaty.
Essentially, such negotiation would be tantamount to bartering with
101. See Cordesman, supra note 4 (responding to the question: "Is the risk of attack,
and the need for an NMD, greater now than it was during the Cold War?").
102. George Lewis, Lisbeth Gronlund, & David Wright, National Missile Defense:
An Indefensible System, FOREIGN POL'Y, Winter 1999-2000, at 121.
103. Lisbeth Gronlund & David Wright, What They Didn't Do, BULL. ATOM.
SCIENTISTS, Nov. 1, 1998, at 50.
104. See Helms, supra note 41, at AI0 (quotations omitted).
Russia over whether the United States could protect itself against a
North Korean missile. 0 5  To illustrate this point, in 1996, President
Clinton refrained from pursuing the deployment of a limited land-based
NMD site in Alaska partly out of concern that Russia would not
acquiesce. 106
Two important events occurred during the summer of 1998 that
dramatically changed the NMD debate and essentially forced President
Clinton to adopt a more receptive view to NMD. These two events
exposed his "3+3" belief (i.e. the United States would be assured three
years warning of a missile threat) as wholly inaccurate. First, the
"Rumsfeld Commission," a non-partisan Commission of experts on
national security headed by former (and current) Defense Secretary
Rumsfeld, released a report that North Korea or Iran could develop an
ICBM within five years and with little warning. 107 Second, North Korea
unexpectedly launched the three-stage Taepo-Dong I missile over Japan,
demonstrating the prescience of the Rumsfeld Commission, as well the
naivet6 of the Clinton Administration's reliance on 3+3. The confluence
of these two events evidenced both the feverish pace at which rogue
states were developing nuclear missiles and exposed, how, by delaying a
response to these threats, the Clinton NMD policy was remarkably
shortsighted. Moreover, it showed how an administration could choose
to ignore past warnings, thereby inviting future perils. To illustrate this
point, as far back as 1989, Jane's Defence Weekly concluded North
Korea could manufacture nuclear devices in five years' time, and the
means to deliver them soon afterward. 1
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Sensing a heightened public urgency for NMD following the 1998
events, President Clinton quickly demonstrated a newfound affection for
NMD. By January 1999, President Clinton requested an additional $6.6
billion in new money for research and development of NMD, as well as
pledging to make a definitive decision on NMD by as early as June
105. Id.
106. See Barry, supra note 75, at 9. Cf Frank Gaffney, Clinton's Missile Defense
Misfire, NAT'L REV ONLINE (Sept. 1, 2000), available at http://www.nationalreview.com/
comment/comment090100c.shtml. Frank J. Gaffney, J.R., Director for the Center of
Security Policy and Assistant Secretary of Defense in President Reagan's Defense
Department, unfavorably compares President Clinton's reluctance to anger foreign
leaders on NMD development with the determined resolve exhibited by President
Reagan on deployment of Pershing Missiles in 1983: "If Ronald Reagan had caved in the
face of... these [political] campaigns and the Pershings and cruise missiles were not
deployed in Western Europe in 1983 as agreed by NATO, the Cold War might have
ended very differently."
107. See Lewis, Gronlund & Wright, supra note 102, at 121-22.
108. Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., North Korean Arsenal, JANE'S DEFENCE WKLY, Sept.
23, 1989, at 594.
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2000.109 Some observers suggested that the President's decision
reflected either the desire to "co-opt a Republican hobby horse that was
likely to win congressional approval" or to provide Vice President Al
Gore with "political cover" in his the 2000 Presidential election.1 0
President Clinton, however, refused to agree to the enactment of NMD
"as soon as technologically feasible" for, as noted earlier, he feared
Russian and European reaction. Instead, one commentator believes that
President Clinton followed the "politically cautious middle path" by
requesting additional funding for the short-term, but avoiding any long-
term decisions."'1 Both Democrats and Republicans in Congress,
however, sensed the impending threat presented by the proliferation of
nuclear weapons, and in July 1999, by a wide margin, passed the
National Missile Defense Act of 1999, stipulating that NMD would be
deployed "as soon as technologically feasible." Foreseeing an
overridden veto, Clinton signed the Act that same month.'
12
In August 2000, in what served as his final presidential act relating to
NMD and the ABM Treaty, President Clinton, in one sweeping decision,
seemed to offer a microcosm for all of his related decisions on
NMD/ABM policy: he elected to opt-out of a decision to deploy NMD,
instead deferring it to his successor. Citing three reasons, all of which
were likely self-induced by eight years of political posturing, both on the
domestic and international political arenas, President Clinton essentially
announced that the best NMD policy was no NMD policy until his
successor could review the issue.
First, President Clinton claimed the technology was not ready, though
his restrained approach to NMD development likely contributed greatly
to the absence of sustained technological advancement.' 13  Second,
President Clinton believed that more time was needed to educate the
Russians and allies on NMD. As noted by Gaffney, however, the
109. See Mitchell, supra note 76, at 254.
110. Id. (quoting Mark Thompson, Star Wars: The Sequel (Feb. 15, 1999) and also
noting argument by William Hartung, an analyst at the World Policy Institute, that
Clinton finally caved into the idea of NMD because it would have provided Vice
President Al Gore "some political cover" in the 2000 Presidential election), available at
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/time/1999/02/15/star.wars.html.
11. Jonathan S. Landay, Launching a 'Homeland' Defense, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Jan. 29, 1999, at 1.
112. See Lewis, Gronlund & Wright, supra note 102, at 122.
113. See e.g., Krauthammer, supra note 42, at 22-23. "President Clinton went to
great lengths to constrain and dumb down the testing of high-tech weaponry (particularly
on missile defense) to be 'ABM Treaty compliant."' Id.
Russians and allies had intensified their opposition because of Clinton's
"hapless diplomacy and slavish devotion to the obsolete and defunct
1972 ABM Treaty."'" 4 Third, President Clinton alleged that China could
respond to NMD by building up their nuclear arsenal, though, as
discussed later, most experts agree that China will undoubtedly expand
their nuclear arsenal irrespective of NMD.
B. Current & Future Variations of NMD
The future of NMD will likely include a combination of land, sea, and
space technology. Over the past two decades, all three of these
technological avenues have provided promise, albeit with significant
disappointment along the way. The benefits and drawbacks of each of
these three options, as well as an examination of "theater missile
defense" systems will be discussed next. Theater missile defense may
provide an important nexus linking the three forms of NMD technology,
thereby offering the most expansive global deterrence against nuclear
missiles.
1. Land Based NMD
By itself, land-based national missile defense has often been regarded
as the United States' "selfish option." That is, the most recent plan on
land-based NMD included two sites, one in Alaska and one in North
Dakota, which, collectively, would have the combined capacity to
defend only the United States and Canada."
15
Despite its geographic limitations, land-based NMD was embraced by
the Clinton Administration. Specifically, the Administration proposed
to construct an initial site in Alaska, where one acquisition radar and five
early-warning radars would support one-hundred interceptor missiles.
Soon thereafter, missile defense would return to the home of Safeguard,
as one-hundred interceptors and a second acquisition radar would be
placed in Grand Forks, North Dakota, representing the second land-
based NMD site. According to John Deutch, former Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, a best-case scenario under the Clinton plan
would have found the Alaska site fully operational in 2005, with the
North Dakota site following in 2008.116
Equally notable, the Clinton Administration's proposed land-based
NMD focused on "midcourse" technology, whereby a combination of
satellite sensors and radars detect and analyze an enemy attack,
114. See Gaffney, supra note 106, at 24.
115. See Thompson, supra note 59, at 25.
116. John Deutch, Harold Brown, & John P. White, National Missile Defense: Is
There Another Way?, FOREIGN POL'Y, Summer 2000, at 91.
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including the detection of any decoys. Upon detection, the system
launches interceptor missiles from the United States in an attempt to
destroy incoming warheads in outer space roughly halfway through their
flight. 117 Once near the enemy missile, the interceptor releases its
Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV), employing both infrared and
visible light sensors to help it distinguish the missile from decoys and
thereby "hit" and destroy the missile.'
8
Simply put, the Clinton Administration's system would have defended
the United States from nuclear attack by launching ground-based
interceptors to collide with nuclear missiles. Importantly, though some
critics of NMD lump this form of NMD technology together with
previous, more extravagant forms, Professor George Lewis, Associate
Director of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, notes that this limited system should not be confused
with President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) which was
intended to create a massive, space-based shield that employed laser
technology to conceivably thwart a large Soviet nuclear attack. "9
Along these same lines, the scope of the Clinton Administration's
land-based NMD system would have been deliberately narrow and
deployed slowly over the course of fifteen to twenty years. In fact, the
Administration purposely created three levels of "capability" that would
have been achieved over that time period. Particularly, Capability 1
(C1), with the deployment of one-hundred interceptors in Alaska, would
have been able to defend against a maximum of thirty nuclear warheads.
Notably, Alaska was selected as the first site because North Korea was
deemed to serve as the most imminent missile threat. 120 With limited
radar capacity and only one-hundred interceptors based in Alaska,
however, CI would have had little, if any, capacity to intercept a missile
launched from the Middle East aimed at an East Coast city.
12 1
117. MICHAEL E. O'HANLON, DEFENSE POLICY CHOICES FOR THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION 2001-05 144-45 (2001); see also Lewis, Gronlund & Wright, supra
note 102, at 123. According to the authors,
[t]he NMD system would then use different sensors to detect the missile and
any objects it releases, track these objects accurately enough to guide the
interceptors, and attempt to discriminate between the real warhead and decoys
or other false targets. These sensors include five existing early-warning radars
in California, central Alaska, Great Britain, Greenland, and Massachusetts.
118. See Lewis, Gronlund & Wright, supra note 102, at 123.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 123-24.
121. See O'Hanlon, supra note 117, at 156.
Capability 2 (C2) would have maintained the number of interceptors at
one-hundred in Alaska and complemented them with increased radar
technology to distinguish decoy missiles, thereby providing increased
capacity to intercept an attack by a Middle Eastern nation. r22 Finally,
Capability 3 (C3) would have brought the total number of interceptors in
Alaska and North Dakota to over two hundred, and would have added
space based weapons, provided that the technology was available in
2015-2020.123 Importantly, the Clinton Administration's plan would not
have had the capacity to provide defense to any allies outside of Canada
and Mexico during C l and possibly during C2.
Not only has land-based NMD been criticized for its failure to provide
extended deterrence to our allies, but its technological test record has
proved mixed. In fact, under the Clinton Administration, three land-
based NMD tests yielded two failures following one success.
24
Optimism for the system was heightened after Integrated Flight Test-3
(IFT-3) successfully destroyed a mock warhead. 1 25  Some critics,
however, claimed that the test was not a complete success, alleging that
the interceptor mistakenly pursued one of the missile's decoys, and only
accidentally hit the missile. Professor Gordon Mitchell of the University
of Pittsburgh argues "subsequent disclosures revealed that a faulty star
map caused the exo-atmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) to drift off course
and hone in on a decoy until the very last second, when the interceptor
inexplicably veered into the missile."' 126 Likewise, Jane Nolan, Foreign
Affairs Expert at the Eisenhower Institute and former Foreign Affairs
Advisor to 1988 Democratic Presidential Nominee Michael Dukakis,
asserts that rogue states can "easily and cheaply employ decoys."
127
Only four months after JFT-3, the Clinton Administration carried out a
second test of land-based NMD systems. In IFT-4, however, Raytheon-
built EKV infrared seekers malfunctioned, causing the interceptor to
122. See Lewis, Gronlund & Wright, supra note 102, at 125; see also O'Hanlon,
supra note 117, at 159 (noting that the increased radar technology includes the usage of
three x-band radars).
123. See Lewis, Gronlund & Wright, supra note 102, at 124; O'Hanlon, supra note
117, at 159.
124. See, e.g., Mark Helprin, The War of Lights, NAT'L REV., Feb. 22, 1999, at 36
(noting that during the presidency of George H. W. Bush, a land-based NMD test
produced a successful result, despite employing now-antiquated computer technology.
Specifically, in January 1991, a Minuteman ICBM was launched from California and, at
as it neared its target in the South Pacific, an interceptor was launched and its EKV
successfully distinguished the warhead from the decoys and obliterated the warhead).
125. Mitchell, supra note 76, at 260.
126. Id. (citing James Glanz, Military Experts Debate the Success of Warhead
Missile Interceptor Test, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 14, 2000, 3A).
127. Jane Nolan, Foreign Affairs Expert, Eisenhower Institute, Presentation at New
England School of Law's International Law Forum (Nov. 8, 2001) (on file with author).
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miss the missile. 28 In July 2000, the Administration tried IFT-5, but the
interceptor failed to separate from its second-stage booster, thereby
allowing the mock enemy missile to complete its course. 129  Taken
together, these failed tests seemed to corroborate the earlier admonitions
of Air Force General Larry Welch (ret.), who in his 1998 Report of the
Panel on Reducing Risk in Ballistic Missile Defense Flight Test
Programs maintained that NMD was being "rushed to failure."'130 On
the other hand, even critics of NMD have noted that IFT-5 was not a fair
indicator of land-based NMD because "some components were not
ready in time to be included in the experiment. 13' Moreover, IFT-5
yielded some positive findings as the X-band radar provided accurate
information to the interceptor and the "Battle Management/Command,
Control, Communications system" (i.e. land-based NMD's software
component) performed well.t12
Last summer, advocates for land-based NMD and its "hit-to-kill"
technology received an enormous boost when, on July 15, 2001, the
Bush Administration conducted its first successful test. In this trial, a
target ICBM was launched from Vandenberg Air Force base in
California and was successfully destroyed by an interceptor that had
been launched from the Kwajalein atoll in the Pacific Ocean.' 33
Importantly, according to Army Major General Willie B. Nance, Jr., the
test represented "further confirmation of the feasibility of 'hit-to-kill'
technology."' 34  Perhaps even more significant, the test gave further
credence to President Bush's hope to expedite the construction and
deployment of a land-based NMD system to as early as 2004.135
According to a State Department memo from July 2001, "deployment of
an interim ground-based system in Alaska could be completed as early
128. See Mitchell, supra note 76, at 261.
129. Rich Lowry, Try, Try Again, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, (July 10, 2000), available at
http://www.nationalreview.com/lowry/lowry071000.html.
130. See O'Hanlon, supra note 117, at 152 (citing Office of the Secretary of
Defense, Report of the Panel on Reducing Risk in Ballistic Missile Defense Flight Test
Programs, Feb. 27, 1998).
131. See Mitchell, supra note 76, at 261.
132. See Lowry, supra note 129.
133. Rich Lowry, Bull's-eye!, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, (July 16, 2001), available at
http://www.nationalreview.com/lowry/lowryprint071601.html.
134. Vernon Loeb, Pentagon Says Missile Killer Hit "Sweet Spot," WASH. POST,
Aug. 10, 2001, at A05.
135. See generally Curl, supra note 61.
as 2004." .36
Critics of land-based NMD, however, regard the July 2001 test as a
farce, and one that was preordained to succeed because of overly
simplistic and unrealistic test conditions. According to Professor
Theodore A. Postol, a leading missile defense critic at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, the test was "meaningless" because the
existence of both a dummy warhead and a decoy were pre-programmed,
essentially allowing the interceptor to begin its mission having already
distinguished the missile from the red herrings: that is, there was no
"real-time" discrimination as would be required in an actual missile
attack assuming decoys are used by the adversary. Put bluntly,
Professor Postol belittles the Bush Administration's initial land-based
NMD test as "basically demonstrating that they have the guidance and
the control to hit a cooperating target."'
' 37
Similarly, Dr. Richard Garwin, a physicist and member of both the
Council on Foreign Relations and the Rumsfeld Commission, offers
equally derisive language by characterizing the enemy missiles fired
during both July 2001 tests as "puppy dogs, wagging their tails, and
wanting to be slapped with hit-to-kill interceptors."' 13  Even General
Nance, a proponent of NMD concedes these tests do not stress
discrimination between warheads and decoys. 139 In response, however,
other supporters of land-based NMD note that decoys are hard to deploy
along side missiles, as evidenced by the failure of the decoys during the
July 2000 test, and that it is likely that United States will have
information on an adversary's attack and decoy weapons prior to their
launch-"the same way silhouettes of enemy airplanes are provided with
anti-aircraft batteries"-thus challenging the "decoy" criticism often
promulgated by NMD opponents.
40
Despite the apparent drawbacks of land-based NMD, it is clear that
President Bush will have to utilize it in the short-term in order to achieve
a viable NMD.141 On the other hand, both the multiple test failures and
even the qualified test successes will prove politically challenging to
136. See Schweid, supra note 54.
137. See Loeb, supra note 134, at A5.
138. Mitchell, supra note 76, at 259. See also O'Hanlon, supra note 117, at 144-45.
A land-based NMD "would likely be defeated by decoys capable of mimicking real
warheads in the vacuum of outer space." Id.
139. See Loeb, supra note 134.
140. See Lowry, supra note 129.
141. See e.g., Thompson, supra note 59, at 24. Pentagon officials say Bush's
system will have to begin with Clinton's ground-based system-a handful of missiles
deployed as early as 2004-followed by more research into ship and plane-based
interceptors. Ultimately, missile-defense advocates want the space-based lasers, ready to
destroy missiles fired from anywhere at any time, bound for any place." Id.
236
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President Bush in gaining Congressional funding, particularly with a
Senate leadership skeptical of NMD. To further add to his challenge,
any enthusiasm generated from the July 2001 successful test was
dimmed in October 2001, when a computer-run simulation of the NMD
failed to intercept a missile. The failure was caused by a glitch in the
software evaluation station. As a result, the actual October 2001 test
was postponed to late November. 42 In November, it was postponed
again and has not yet been rescheduled.
Over the long-term, however, it is expected that the Bush
Administration will seek to develop land-based NMD that focuses on
attacking the "boost phase" of an enemy missile, rather than the Clinton
Administration's proposed "midcourse" defense posture. 143 As noted by
Ivo H. Daalder, a Senior Fellow of Foreign Policy Studies at the
Brookings Institute (and opponent to NMD), intercepting a missile's
rocket during its boost phase, instead of the missile's warhead in
midcourse, is a superior method of missile defense, for, if a missile is
mirved, "all the warheads are still on the booster."' 44 More specifically,
O'Hanlon finds that because an enemy missile during the boost phase is
"essentially a large, burning gas tank... within the atmosphere or just
outside of it," it would be "highly vulnerable and easy to see and hit."'
' 45
Moreover, missiles cannot deploy decoys during their boost phase.1 46 In
addition, a boost phase land-based NMD ensures that a missile launched
from anywhere in Asia would be destroyed before completing its boost
phas; meaning, its warhead would be unlikely to have the requisite speed
to reach North America.
147
International political considerations may also motivate President
Bush to prefer boost phase technology. Specifically, the Bush
Administration's plan to develop land-based boost phase NMD may
prove diplomatically advantageous over "midcourse" NMD because
ICBMs launched from deep regions within both China and Russia's
would be beyond the range of any land-based boost phase interceptors,
as such missiles would have completed their boost phase before the
142. Bradley Graham, Testing Mishaps Cloud Defense Plans, WASH. POST, Nov. 5,
2001, at A02.
143. See O'Hanlon, supra note 117, at 144-45.
144. See Daalder, supra note 62.
145. See O'Hanlon, supra note 117, at 164.
146. Id.
147. Id.
interceptors could hit them.14  Therefore, boost phase NMD would
serve as a "defense" against only a small portion of Russian and Chinese
ICBMs.
Although boost phase land-based NMD offers several clear
advantages over a midcourse system, some experts identify several
disadvantages as well. First, as noted by former CIA Director Deutch,
hitting something in the boost phase is extremely hard. 149  More
particularly, according to Daalder, intercepting a missile in the boost
phase would require the interceptor to be launched from a location near
the site of the enemy missile launch, i.e. "forward deployed". 50 As any
boost phase land-based NMD would need to be within 1,000 kilometers
of the location of an enemy launch, interceptors would have only two to
three minutes to intercept a missile while in its boost phase., 51 Because
of the initial proximity required between the interceptor and the missile,
the United States would have to rely upon the use of foreign territories
for land-based NMD, a reliance that could be tested during wartime. 152
A related drawback to the land-based boost phase NMD's limited
range of 1,000 kilometers rests in the possible need to move such
interceptors in order to counter new nuclear threats. 53 Because the
interceptors are not easily movable, and because their range is so
restricted, their long-term value would therefore be questionable.
Indeed, given the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well the expressed
desires of multiple authoritarian leaders to acquire such weapons, this
drawback could prove significant.
A third drawback to land-based boost phase NMD pertains to the
uncertainty involving attacking the rocket-the "boost"-rather than the
nuclear warhead, particularly as the warhead would invariably continue
onward, and at an unknown direction and speed. Without question, the
warhead would at some point detonate, at which time it would spread
radioactive material. Experts find it unlikely a warhead fired by an
Asian nation could reach North America after losing its rocket during
the boost phase. 54 Yet, the radioactive threat posed by a detonated
warhead over an unknown location would prove potentially harmful to
global health.
Finally, though a land-based boost phase NMD may prove more
amenable to Moscow and Beijing because it would be unable to
148. Id. at 167-68.
149. See Deutch, Brown & White, supra note 116, at 95.
150. Id. See also Daalder, supra note 62.
151. See O'Hanlon, supra note 117, at 167.
152. Cf Id. at 39-41 (sea-based boost phase NMD would not have this drawback).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 164.
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intercept most of their missiles, the same logic holds that it would not be
able to stop a number of missiles fired from inside Asia, as interceptors
would need to be placed within 1,000 kilometers of an enemy attack in
order to stop it. As a result, not only would such a system prove less
worrisome to Russia and China, but it may also prove of no deterrence to
a number of more threatening Asian nations, including Iran and
Afghanistan.
Despite these possible drawbacks, land-based boost phase NMD
appears to be an important component of the Bush Administration's
aggressive approach to NMD development along with continuing midcourse
NMD development pioneered during the Clinton Administration. To
illustrate this point, while the Clinton Administration viewed arming
Fort Greely with interceptors as a long-term goal, the Bush Administration,
according to a recent State Department memo, "intends to place between
five and 10 silo-based missile interceptors at Fort Greely for testing
against missiles fired from an aircraft and perhaps from ground-based
locations."' 155 Clearly, land-based NMD will be an integral part of the
Bush Administration's larger NMD system.
2. Sea Based NMD
Far less developed and perhaps less useful, sea-based NMD offers
another option for the Bush Administration. Although information
relating to sea-based NMD is more speculative than that available for
land-based NMD, consensus suggests that such a system would involve
the placement of interceptors onboard U.S. Navy's Aegis-class warships.
In fact, the Heritage Foundation estimates that within the next five to ten
years, Aegis-class warships could be equipped with heat-seeking
missiles at the cost of $8 billion.156
One major advantage to such a system would pertain to the mobility
of these interceptors. That is, unlike the more stationary land-based
NMD, sea-based NMD could be transported across the globe in the span
of days depending upon both the nature and geography of a threat.
Because it is more mobile, sea-based NMD could protect allies and far
away places in ways that a land-based NMD could not.
A second advantage to sea-based NMD relates to its capability to
provide boost-phase interception.157 To illustrate this point, if the Bush
155. See Schewid, supra note 54.
156. See Murdock, supra note 2.
157. See O'Hanlon, supra note 117, at 166.
Administration sought to intercept an Iranian missile launch at its boost
phase, placement of sea-based boost phase NMD may be essential.'58
Significantly, however, there are a number of important drawbacks to
sea-based NMD. First, like the land-based boost phase NMD discussed
above, sea-based NMD requires close proximity to an enemy launching
area in order to be effective. For instance, if interceptors were placed on
warships in hopes of stopping a missile fired from North Korea, those
warships would need to be positioned in international waters just off the
coast of North Korea. 159 Following this reasoning, if a missile were
fired from deep inside China, Russia, or Afghanistan, a sea-based
interceptor would be unable to intercept it.1 60  Therefore, sea-based
NMD, like land-based boost phase interceptors, offers diminished
deterrence to nuclear missiles positioned throughout most of Asia.
A second drawback of sea-based NMD relates to its present and near-
term technology. In short, scientists have yet to develop the capable
means of deploying sea-based NMD. In fact, on December 15, 2001, the
Pentagon cited "poor performance" as the reason behind its canceling of
the "Area Missile Defense" program, a sea-based NMD program that
had been seen by experts as the furthest along in development and was
expected to protect warships and amphibious landing forces overseas
from attacks by missiles or manned aircraft. 16' The Area Missile
Defense program, which was scheduled for deployment in 2003, was
essentially designed to serve as a sea-based patriot missile system, and
would have been used to protect small selected areas, if other defenses
failed. 162  Compared with other sea-based NMD systems, the Area
Missile Defense program was seen as elementary, a reputation that has
only prompted NMD critics, such as Joseph Cirincione, a missile
defense critic at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, to
hail, "this a very serious setback for missile defense programs, because it
shows that even the simple stuff is difficult."'
163
The technological challenges of sea-based NMD have been most
prevalent in the integration of NMD systems into naval vessels that had
not been originally designed to employ such systems. In fact, one
commentator has opined that Aegis-class warships "are simply not
designed to launch missiles of the size and performance required... its
158. See id. at 167.
159. See Thompson, supra note 59, at 28.
160. Id. See also O'Hanlon, supra note 117, at 167 (finding that "Sea-based boost-
phase systems would not be useful against missiles from all potential threats, since not
all are near international or friendly waters.").
161. See Thomas E. Ricks & Steven Mufson, Missile Defense System Canceled,
WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2001 at AO1.
162. Id.
163. Id. (quoting Joseph Cirincione).
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nonsense, as the Navy is the first to admit."' 64 Therefore, deployment of
sea-based NMD would require some alteration to these warships,
particularly, as noted by Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Rick Lehner,
spokesman for the Defense Department's Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization, in order to update their antiquated computer technology.' 
65
Because of the possible technological obstacles in achieving a viable
sea-based NMD, it is likely the Bush Administration will focus more on
land-based NMD. However, because of the tremendous strategic
advantage of mobility provided by sea-based NMD, it is also likely the
Bush Administration will devote a significant portion of its NMD
research budget to sea-based NMD. If they work, "sea-based interceptors"
will become part of the core of a nationwide anti-missile shield.
166
3. Air & Space Based NMD
Although not likely available until 2015-2020, air and spaced based
NMD may provide the best security against an incoming missile attack.
In fact, according to Cordesman, many Air Force officials believe that
an airborne laser system would serve as the best possible boost phase
NMD, 167 for it may not be constrained by the geographic proximity
requirement existent in both land-based and sea-based boost phase
NMD. More importantly, such laser technology has been in
development for over a decade, as discussed earlier in regards to SDI.1
68
According to a number of experts, air-based NMD will likely be
available far sooner than space-based NMD. It is expected that "the
military is grooming [plane-based lasers] to play major roles in a
national missile-defense system aimed at ocean-crossing ICBMs."'
' 69
Simply put, such technology will prove vital in the Bush plan to employ
"boost-phase" NMD. To illustrate the importance of air-based NMD to
the Bush Administration, Air Force Colonel Ellen Pawlikowski of the
Airborne Laser Program predicts that a jumbo jet carrying a giant high-
powered laser will represent "the first U.S. capability to intercept a
missile in the boost phase."'
170
164. See Barry, supra note 75.
165. See Ricks & Mufson, supra note 161.
166. See Graham, supra note 142.
167. See Cordesman, supra note 4.
168. See Barry, supra note 75.
169. Thompson, supra note 59, at 24.
170. Nightline: Shoot to Kill: The Debate Over Missile Defense (ABC television
broadcast, July 24, 2001) (statement of Ellen Pawlikowski) [hereinafter Nightline
In addition to plane-based lasers, an orbiting network of laser
emanating "killer satellites" may be available as soon as 2020, though
such technology remains on the drawing board. 171 Moreover, as noted
by Derek H. Chollet, a former Clinton aide on national security issues
and James M. Goldgeier, an associate professor of political science at
George Washington University, unlike other forms of NMD, space-
based NMD would help the United States defend its space assets,
including its critical satellites.
72
As they similarly denigrated Star Wars technology twenty years ago,
critics of air and space based NMD regard it as both exotic and
unrealistic. 73 Cirincione belittles airborne NMD as "highly vulnerable.
It's a big, fat, and slow 747 [airplane]. It could be shot down with
ground-to-air missiles, with interceptors or jammed from the ground."' 174
Like President Reagan, however, President Bush may view pursuing
the best possible NMD as the worthiest and most humane of achievable
goals. During this undoubtedly challenging pursuit, President Bush
should gain encouragement from the guiding words of President Reagan
twenty years earlier: "there will be failures and setbacks, just as there
will be successes and breakthroughs. And as we proceed, we must
remain constant in preserving the nuclear deterrent and maintaining a
solid capacity for flexible response."'' 75 Perhaps even more inspiring,
President Bush can seek encouragement from the actions of President
Kennedy, who refused to let initial failures in the space program deter
the country from landing on the moon.
176
4. Theater Missile Defense (TMD)
A "fourth" option in the NMD menu may ultimately serve as the best
option, even though it is not generally classified as "NMD technology."
Theater Missile Defense (TMD) systems are those regionally based and
used to defend against short and intermediate ballistic missiles. Notably,
such systems are limited by the 1997 U.S.-Russian demarcation
agreement, which restricts testing of TMD interceptor missiles to 3,500
Transcript], available at http://www.abcnewsstore.com/product-details.cgi?itemcode
=NO 10724+0 1.
171. See Thompson, supra note 59, at 24.
172. Derek H. Chollet and James M. Goldgeier, Missile Defense in Perspective,
WASH. TIMES, May 22, 2001, at A19.
173. See Barry, supra note 75 (finding that "[such technology] sounds neat, but...
developing the command-and-control networks to translate those warnings into timely
engagement orders would take [many years].").
174. See Nightline Transcript, supra note 170 (statement of Joseph Cirincione).
175. See President's Speech on Military Spending and a New Defense, supra note 1,
at A20.
176. See Lowry, supra note 129.
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kilometers.
177
The greatest advantage to TMD systems is their ability to defend
against present and near-future threats. In fact, since Russia and China
are the only two Asian nations possessing ICBMs, and since North
Korea and possibly Iran are the only two other Asian nations likely to
have such capacity by 2010, some argue that the bulk of NMD resources
should be devoted to defending against short and intermediate range
missiles. According to former CIA Director Deutch, short and
intermediate range missiles are far more threatening to American and
Allied interests abroad than are ICBMs: theater ballistic missiles have
proliferated in the Middle East, South Asia, and elsewhere, can carry
nuclear weapons that threaten our allies and U.S. forces stationed
abroad, and are more likely to be used in conflict. 178 In fact, if employed
today, TMD systems could protect clusters of U.S. warships, bases of
American soldiers, American territories overseas (e.g. Guam), and the
geography, of a large number of allies from short and medium range
missiles.' 9
In addition, TMD systems provide extraordinary extended deterrence,
for they can positioned in a variety of ways and locations. Their
operational flexibility has been highlighted by Secretary Rumsfeld who
maintains that a theater system could be used to help protect "a friend or
an ally or a location where we have deployed troops.
A third advantage to TMD systems relates to their undisputed
compatibility with the ABM Treaty.' 18 Plainly stated, the ABM Treaty
prohibits defenses against ICBMs, not short and medium range missiles.
Therefore, TMD systems do not violate the ABM Treaty. 182 However,
with President Bush's December 13, 2001 announcement to withdraw
from the ABM Treaty after a period of six months, this advantage may
no longer be relevant in the near future.
177. See O'Hanlon, supra note 117, at 155.
178. See Deutch, Brown & White, supra note 116, at 93.
179. Vernon Loeb, Allies Join Pentagon Research on Zapping Missiles, WASH.
POST, Aug. 4, 2001, at A03.
180. Kathryn Jean Lopez, Donald Rumsfeld Says.. ., NAT'L REV. ONLINE, (June 6,
2000), available at http://www.nationalreview.com/interrogatory/interrogatory/060600 .html.
181. See Loeb, supra note 179. This agreement on compatibility is demonstrated by
the fact that despite the ABM Treaty Russia has a TDM in place which uses "the S-
300... to shoot down incoming short-range missiles," and the United States has been
working on developing such systems around the world.
182. This is true unless TMD systems are demonstrated to destroy ICBMs in their
boost phase.
Finally, TMD systems are versatile and readily capable of being
integrated into a larger NMD network. In particular, sea-based TMD
systems have been cited as readily adaptable. In fact, a recent Pentagon
study concluded, "an NMD system could be upgraded by integrating the
hundreds of interceptors to be deployed as part of the ship-based Navy
Theater Wide missile defense system. These interceptors would be
plugged into the sensor infrastructure of the NMD system." 183
TMD Systems do have possible drawbacks, however. Most
importantly, some experts believe TMD Systems are technologically
deficient and are unable to defend against ICBMs. Specifically,
Professor Mitchell argues that TMD systems generally have "limited
interceptor velocities, constrained engagement software and test
protocols, and lack of cueing of target trajectory information from
external sensors."' 84 As a result, such systems "have minimal capability
against ICBMs."' 185 On the other hand, some observers believe TMD
systems could also be used against ICBMs as well provided that such
systems were located within the requisite distance of ICBM launch sites
to intercept those ICBMs during their boost phase.' 86
Another flaw of TMD systems may be found in their inability to
provide much extended protection. That is, such systems, without the
co-existence of NMD systems, may not provide much protection for our
allies, particularly those in Europe. For instance, because Great Britain
is more than 7,000 kilometers away from southern Iran, any American
TMD system capable of protecting Great Britain from Iran would be in
violation of the 1997 U.S.-Russian demarcation agreement.187
In further exploring the advantages and disadvantages of TMD
systems, analysis of previous and current TMD systems is worth
discussing. Notably, TMD systems employ a variety of technologies, be
it laser-generated light beams or highly mobile air-based interceptors of
short-range missiles.
First, the United States and Israel are working together on the
"Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL)," a TMD system that is designed
specifically to defend Israel against Katyusha rockets fired from
Lebanon.188 Promisingly, the laser recently downed more than twenty
Katyusha rockets during an exercise at the White Sands Missile Range
183. See Lewis, Gronlund & Wright, supra note 102, at 124.
184. See Mitchell, supra note 76, at 259.
185. Id.
186. See generally Loeb, supra note 179.
187. See O'Hanlon, supra note 117, at 155 (noting that Italy is more than 3,500
kilometers from the most distant parts of Iran).
188. See Loeb, supra note 179 (noting that specifically, the laser generates "intense
light beams through a chemical process that combines deuterium and fluoride."); see
also Mitchell, supra note 76, at 245.
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in New Mexico. 189
Yet, not all observers are convinced THEL will become an effective
TMD system. Most importantly, THEL's design is geared specifically
for the Israeli-Lebanese conflict, and thus may not be adaptable to other
disputes. Notwithstanding, Secretary Rumsfeld has noted that the
"sharing of [TMD] capability with Israel," could lead to more and
different "technologies that could be shared."' 90  Additionally, some
have criticized THEL's test design, which, until the recent successful
exercises at White Sands, had focused exclusively on shooting stationary
ground targets-a test design analogized by some as "a type of strap-
down chicken test, where you strap the chicken down, blow it apart with
a shotgun, and say shotguns kill chickens. But that's quite different
from trying to kill a chicken in a dense forest while it's running away
from you.' 91
A second TMD system under development is the Medium Extended
Air Defense System (MEADS), a project bringing together the United
States, Germany, and Italy in the creation of a TMD system utilizing
"rapid-mobility technology" to protect troops from short-range
missiles. 192 Similarly, the U.S. and Israel are working on the "Arrow"
TMD system in order to improve defenses against Iran's Shahab
missiles, which have a range of 1,200 miles. 193 Like with the test
designs employed for THEL, however, critics such as Philip Coyle, the
Pentagon's former top testing official, find that testing for MEADS and
Arrow involved "tightly scripted experiments that were not operationally
realistic."'
194
As the Bush Administration develops its NMD program, most experts
agree that the Administration would be well served by incorporating
TMD systems into any global defensive shield. An emphasis on TMD
systems may help reduce some of the opposition expressed by European
allies of the Administration's larger NMD program. While NMD has
189. See Loeb, supra note 179; see also, Mitchell, supra note 76, at 245. Army
General John Costello, commander of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense
Command, believes the THEL system, "could revolutionize warfare by protecting troops
from rockets, mortars, and other artillery." Id.
190. See Lopez, supra note 180 (quoting Donald Rumsfeld).
191. See Mitchell, supra note 76, at 245 (quoting comments by the Department of
Defense's High Energy Laser Executive Review Panel: "it would be very difficult [for
systems like THEL] to acquire targets, control the HEL beam, and destroy targets.").
192. See Loeb, supra note 179.
193. Id.
194. See Mitchell, supra note 76, at 259 (quoting Phillip Coyle).
often been regarded as an initiative to primarily boost the United States'
defense against nuclear threats, Italy, Germany, Japan and Israel have
shown interest in TMD.'95 Therefore, if the Bush Administration were
to include TMD systems into a larger NMD program, it would likley
stimulate international support for the entire NMD program.
Perhaps most significantly, TMD systems would likely bolster
"extended deterrence." The need for extended deterrence seems clear,
particularly when observing this nation's collaboration abroad involving
the expansion of democracy, the U.S. cannot leave major allies exposed
to nuclear attack while protecting only itself.1 96 The fact that the United
States and several European allies 197 have joined forces on TMD
projects strongly suggests that many European nations agree that missile
defense simply makes sense for their own interests.198 Simply put, if an
adversary pointed a missile at London, would that not have almost the
same effect on our response as would a missile pointed at Los
Angeles? 199  Thankfully, President Bush has expressed a strong
willingness to emphasize extended deterrence within his NMD program.
In fact, the President has referred to a "layered" shield that, in his own
words, would protect "the entire United States, as well as U.S. allies and
troops abroad, from intercontinental ballistic missiles. ' 2°  In doing so,
the President has won over even his skeptics, such as Professor
Goldgeier, who acknowledges that the President's willingness to
incorporate TMD systems into his NMD program suggests that he has
made "clear that [NMD] is only one part of a broader U.S. defense
strategy."'2°
III. ARGUMENTS AGAINST NMD: FLAWED ATTACKS ON DETERRENCE
Opponents of NMD offer an array of criticisms that, initially, seem
persuasive. However, upon closer inspection, most of these criticisms
fail to effectively include the importance of deterrence and extended
deterrence when assessing NMD. Moreover, these criticisms invite
equally persuasive counter-arguments.
195. See Loeb, supra note 179.
196. Arguably, this is why the United States has been partnering with nations
around the world to develop regional TDMs. Id.
197. See Loeb, supra note 179. For greater detail, according to a senior Navy
official [paraphrased by Loeb], "the Pentagon is developing a short-range missile
defense system with Germany and Italy. It is working on both a medium-range theater
defense and a high-energy laser with Israel. It has signed an agreement with Japan for
research on advanced missile components, and it is discussing joint research with Britain
on sophisticated radar." Id.
198. Id.
199. See O'Hanlon, supra note 117, at 147.
200. See Loeb, supra note 179.
201. Chollet and Goldgeier, supra note 172 at A 19.
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A. Alleged Flaw I.- Alternate Delivery Modalities Remain with NMD
Particularly in light of the recent terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001, critics of NMD charge that because it provides zero defense
against non-missile nuclear attacks, namely suitcase bombs, it offers
limited deterrence. Such critics even utilize government studies to
corroborate their points. For instance, one critic finds, "even the CIA's
latest threat analysis says that [the] most likely threats are not incoming
missiles but rather such portable weapons of mass destruction as truck
and suitcase bombs. 2 °2 Suitcase bombs smuggled across the boarder
presents a difficult threat to defend against.20 3
A related argument to the "suit-case bomb" flaw of NMD rests in the
idea that enemies could also deploy short-range missiles from ships near
the United States.204 The Rumsfeld Commission acknowledged that,
over the next 10 years, it might be easier "for an emerging missile state
to develop shorter-range, ship-launched ballistic missiles than ICBMs.
Because such missiles have short flight times and low maximum
altitudes, they could not be intercepted by the NMD system.
205
Following the logic of this argument, any form of defense, unless it
can defend against all possible nuclear threats, should not be supported.
Applying this unrealistic reasoning to another setting, the U.S. should
not spend resources on border patrol officers to inspect the baggage of
those attempting to enter the United States for nuclear materials because
other delivery modalities-such as ICBMs or short-range missiles-
remain.
Supporters of NMD further illuminate the shortsightedness of this
argument. For instance, David R. Tanks, Defense Analyst for the
Institute for Foreign Policy, reminds us "doing nothing about missile
defense because there are other means of delivery of these weapons is
comparable to not searching for a cure for cancer because we could still
die of heart attack., 20 6 Likewise, Deroy Murdock, a Senior Fellow at the
202. See Thompson, supra note 59, at 23-24.
203. See Gronlund & Wright, supra note 103, at 49. Two of the Rumseld
Commissioners, Richard L. Garwin and Barry Blechman, have separately stated that they
see smuggled weapons as the greatest threat to the United States from North Korea, Iran,
and Iraq.
204. See Richard L. Garwin, Keeping Enemy Missiles at Bay, N.Y. TIMES, July 28,
1998, at A] 5.
205. Lewis, Gronlund & Wright, supra note 102, at 124.
206. David R. Tanks, Defense Analyst, Institute for Foreign Policy, Online
Interview with Washington Post Online (May 2, 2001), available at http://www.
Atlas Economic Research Foundation, provides an equally-telling
analogy: "this is akin to arguing that since some hoodlum might shoot a
New York Police Department officer fatally between the eyes, the entire
force should discard bullet-proof vests."
207
Clearly, alternate modalities of delivery present real threats to
American and international security. Therefore, methods to defend
against these threats should not be overlooked. Indeed, James Lindsay,
Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution,
cautions "missile threats are fundamentally different from truck-
delivered bombs or ship-delivered [bombs] in that they can be delivered
very quickly-making them especially dangerous to the United States in
crisis or wartime conditions.
Interestingly, however, while the United States has yet to deploy any
defenses against nuclear missiles, it has already created some protection
against these alternate modalities through both the Coast Guard and the
border patrol.2° Moreover, concerns that NMD will not intercept short-
range missiles are alleviated by the addition of TMD systems, an
addition endorsed by President Bush. To ignore the threat of nuclear
missiles because of the threat of alternate modalities of delivery merely
ignores the need to deter against nuclear strikes, and only leaves us
vulnerable to other forms of attack.
B. Alleged Flaw H. NMD May Not Work,
Thereby Offering Minimal Deterrence
In "Real World" Crises
Other opponents of NMD contend that because we could never be
one-hundred percent certain such a system would work, it simply cannot
be relied upon during crisis. For instance, one critic notes that even
NMD's requirement of ninety-five percent effectiveness 21  is an
unrealistic goal.21 1 As noted earlier, some critics believe that testing for
NMD has deliberately involved non-real world settings (e.g. operators
knowing in advance what countermeasures they would experience), let
alone actual use of the system in prior conflicts. Such an absence of
information seems particularly troubling given that the, "NMD system
must work the first time it is actually used. If a nuclear ICBM attack
washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/liveonline/01/world/worldtanks05O20 I.htm.
207. Murdock, supra note 2, at 30.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See Lewis, Gronlund & Wright, supra note 102, at 126. Effectiveness is a
measure of how well a system works in the real world. Critics hold that ninety-five
percent effectiveness is an unrealistically optimistic achievement for NMD because such
performance is not achievable in a world with countermeasures.
211. Id.
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occurs, there will be no opportunity to learn on the job."' t2
Admittedly, the expanding existence of countermeasures may interfere
with NMD's effectiveness. As noted by the 1999 National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE) on Countermeasures, "Russia and China have developed
numerous countermeasures and probably are willing to sell the requisite
technologies. '21 3 To illustrate this point, recent Chinese missile tests
have included countermeasures of increasing technological complexity.214
Furthermore, countermeasures are likely to proliferate in congruence
with the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 215 Finally, should nations
deploy countermeasures on their missiles, it would reduce NMD's
capability to defend against an accidental or unauthorized launch.216
Along these same lines, this criticism suggests that NMD would offer
the President little comfort if the United States or allies were threatened
by nuclear weapons. That is, even if NMD somehow possessed ninety-
five percent effectiveness, the President may not rely on a system that he
or she has only ninety-five percent confidence in.2 '7 To illustrate this
point, Daalder images a scenario where the United States and China
were in conflict over Taiwan, yet, with or without NMD, the President
would remain equally fearful of a Chinese nuclear launch: even if we
had NMD, "we could never be certain that it would work and a president
would be far more influenced by the possibility that it would not work
than the possibility that it would. The consequences of getting it wrong
are just too large. [Therefore], both the absence and the presence of
defenses is likely to be less consequential than its advocates claim.
' 218
Another oft-heard scenario relates to a "black-mail" context, where a
hostile nation threatens to launch a nuclear missile at the United States
unless the United States follows the orders of the hostile leader. To
appreciate how real this scenario may be, one need only look at
comments made by Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi after the American
bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi in 1986:
212. Id.
213. Id. (citing 1999 Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Estimate on
Countermeasures (1999)).
214. Id.
215. See O'Hanlon, supra note 117, at 153 (noting that "less sophisticated foes"
could acquire countermeasures if "Russia or China... prove willing to transfer
countermeasures in order to gain hard currency or to complicate U.S. defense planning
that they perceived as aggressive and threatening to their interests.").
216. See Lewis, Gronlund & Wright, supra note 102, at 125-27.
217. Id. at 128.
218. See Daalder, supra note 61.
249
Did not the Americans almost hit you yesterday when you were asleep in your
homes? If they know you have a deterrent force capable of hitting the United
States, they would not be able to hit you. Because if we possessed a deterrent,
missiles that could reach New York, we would have hit in the same moment.
Consequently, we should build this force so they and others will no longer think
about an attack.
Alternatively, some critics of NMD, such as Dr. John Pike of the
Federation of American Scientists, believe that NMD may "embolden
the president to take diplomatic risks that would recklessly expose
thousands (perhaps millions) of civilians ... rather than pursuing
diplomatic alternatives in a stalemated conflict, [the president] could dig
in and dare a 'state of concern' to follow through on its promise to
launch an ICBM, hoping NMD would force the adversary to back
down. 22° If, however, a hostile nation proceeds with a missile attack
and NMD fails, Dr. Pike warns, "you have more dead Americans than
every other war put together., 221 Therefore, whether the President
demonstrates either a reliance or a skepticism to NMD, critics argue, our
diplomatic and militaristic activities would not receive greater "cover"
with an NMD system in place.
Although this argument resonates, it, like the preceding argument
concerning alternate modalities of delivery, fails to compare the likely
damage of a missile attack with NMD and without NMD. First, the
mere presence of NMD provides deterrence. That is, a nation with a
small nuclear arsenal may be less inclined to launch an attack at the
United States if it believed its nuclear missiles would be intercepted.
Also an authoritarian dictator nearing his ousting may seek, as a "final
act," to annihilate an American city. With the existence of NMD,
however, even he would be deterred. Such a phenomenon has been
demonstrated before.222 For example, during World War II, the mere
presence of the high seas fleets of Britain and Germany represented
"threats in being" and such fleets, even when not engaged, impacted the
other's planning.,
223
Second, suggestions that the President would either completely ignore
or completely rely upon NMD if the United States were threatened with
a nuclear attack are overly simplistic. As noted by Cordesman, "there is
no question that NMD capability would give the U.S. greater freedom of
219. See Weldon, supra note 100.
220. See Mitchell, supra note 76, at 242.
221. Id.
222. See Barry, supra note 75.
223. Id. Cf. Lewis, Gronlund & Wright, supra note 102, at 129. This logic runs
counter to experience in deploying air defenses, which have not deterred deployment of
fighter aircraft or bombers."
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action and some immunity to blackmail. 224 To suggest, as Dr. Pike has,
that the president would invite an attack because of his reliance upon
NMD proves incompatible with the actions and attitudes of every
president to date. That is, can we really imagine Presidents Bush,
Clinton, Bush, Reagan, Carter or any other president setting aside
diplomatic negotiations and, instead, cowing a hostile leader to launch a
nuclear missile at the United States because NMD would shoot it down?
In reality, NMD would serve as insurance should diplomatic
negotiations fail or, in the event of a surprise, accidental, or unauthorized
attack.
Third, and most importantly, this argument fails on a moral level. Put
simply, if NMD intercepts only seventy-five percent of incoming
missiles, how many millions of lives would be saved if a hostile nation
were to launch four missiles aimed at four different American cities?
Even an effectiveness rate of fifty percent would still prevent
incalculable damage. 225
To illustrate these points, keep in mind that, according to the Effects of
Nuclear War, a 1979 Office of Technology Assessment study, a single
one-megaton warhead detonated over Detroit would instantly kill 70,000
citizens within a 1.7 mile radius, and of the 1.32 million of citizens
within 7.4 miles of detonation, 220,000 would die and 430,000 would be
injured.226 Given the horror and destruction caused by the September
l1th terrorist attacks, one can only imagine a scenario where the
magnitude of damage is greater by over 250,000 American fatalities.
Again, we ask, if four missiles are launched at the United States, would
saving three of the four cities targeted prove the effectiveness of NMD?
C. Alleged Flaw III: NMD Is Too Expensive
Since 1962, the United States has spent over $100 billion on missile227
defense projects . Of that $100 billion, $60 billion has been spent
since 1985. 28 More recently, $5.1 billion has been spent on missile
defense projects during the Fiscal Year 2001. Additionally, President
Bush has requested $8.3 billion for Fiscal Year 2002, an increase of
224. See Cordesman, supra note 4 (emphasis added).
225. See generally Lewis, Gronlund & Wright, supra note 102, at 130.
226. Murdock, supra note 2, at 30.
227. Mitchell, supra note 76, at 268.
228. Steven A. Hildreth & Amy F. Woolf, Introduction, in Missile Defense: The
Current Debate, supra note 20, at 2.
almost 61% over the preceding Fiscal Year.229 Over the next five years,
it is expected that more than $30 billion will be spent on these projects;
cost estimates vary widely over the long-term, though the complete Bush
NMD program is expected to cost over $200 billion.23°
Because expenditures on missile defense appear costly at first glance,
some have argued that NMD is simply too expensive. For instance,
Senator Barbara Boxer (D-CA) denounces NMD as a "wasteful weapons
system... that wastes our tax dollars and gives no benefits to the
military. ' 23 1 Similarly, Senator Max Cleland (D-GA, Armed Services
Committee member) regards NMD as "a system that doesn't work and is
going to cost hundreds of billions of dollars. 232  Another NMD
opponent, Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL), warns that spending on NMD
will "be the reference point for the budget debate in the future." 233
Moreover, Daalder focuses on the "opportunity cost" of money spent on
missile defense: "the opportunity costs to going ahead with defenses...
means that we may have less money available for intelligence,
diplomacy, and other defensive activities to try to prevent these other
ways of attack., 234 Like Daalder, Senator Cleland highlights this alleged
opportunity cost: NMD "will actually weaken our defense by taking
money away from the services on the projects that we know will
work.,
235
Conversely, one can make a more persuasive argument that the U.S.
has not spent enough on missile defense projects. As noted by Director
Deutch, the United States has spent only 1 to 1.5% of its yearly
Department of Defense budget on these projects, even though we remain
defenseless against nuclear attacks. 36 Consequently, one can contrast
how the United States devoted ten percent of its defense budget to
229. Id. at 3.
230. See Deutch, Brown & White, supra note 116, at 95-96. See also Thompson,
supra note 59, at 28; Lewis, Gronlund & Wright, supra note 102, at 124. As of 1998,
Pentagon estimates for deploying and operating an Alaska-based CI and C2 system for
20 years were $21.5 and $28.3 billion, respectively. However, there are no public cost
estimates for the C3 system and, as for virtually all major defense programs in such an
early phase of development, the actual costs are likely to be considerably higher."; see
also Weldon, supra note 100 (noting that in 1997 the Congressional Budget Office
estimated that a multi-layered missile defense system, with space-based sensors and
tracking, could cost up to $60,000,000,000).
231. Barbara Boxer, Statement on FY 1996 Budget, CONGRESSIONAL PRESS
RELEASES (Federal Document Clearing House, Inc.), May 8, 1995, at 3.
232. See Nightline Transcript, supra note 170.
233. See Mitchell, supra note 76, at 255.
234. See Daalder, supra note 62, at 3.
235. See Nightline Transcript, supra note 170; see also Nolan, supra note 127
(asserting "military services have been least avid proponents of missile defenses that
would take money away from other programs.").
236. See Deutch, Brown & White, supra note 116, at 95-96.
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defend the Persian Gulf with how little it has spent on defending its own
citizens from nuclear attack.237 Similarly, one commentator has found
that the already minimal amount spent on missile defense seems even
miniaturized when compared with other American spending habits: "we
spend three times what we spend on strategic defense on cookies and
crackers, six times as much on sausages and prepared meats, and ten
times as much on lottery tickets. By any humanitarian measure cost is
immaterial."238
Sadly, the "cost-effectiveness" of NMD can only be determined in
certainty if missiles were launched at the United States. 239 Given this, it
seems the most sensible policy would be to deter missiles from being
launched in the first place. In this regard, Congressman Curt Weldon
(R-PA, Armed Services Committee) asks, "how much is Chicago worth?
How much is Cincinnati worth? Is Philadelphia worth 100 million or
500 million?
240
History has borne out this notion. When the British parliament
decided in the early 1930s that an air-defense system was too costly, it
undoubtedly spent funds on other "worthwhile" programs that would
have been allocated to an air-defense system.24 1 As evidenced by the
unabated Nazi air raids over Britain in the years that followed, however,
one can only wonder whether those same parliamentarians remorsefully
gained a better appreciation for the "cost-effectiveness" of defending
one's homeland.
More recently in history, and far more harrowingly in impact, the
absurdity of the "cost-effectiveness" argument was vividly seen by the
destruction caused by the September 11 th attacks, where the despotic Al
Queda Network, and its state-sponsor, the Taliban, ruthlessly
orchestrated the murder of over 4,000 Americans, as well as hundreds of
foreign nationals. Considering that a single nuclear warhead lofted at
New York City by Saddam Hussein-or even one accidentally launched
by a French nuclear submarine-would instantly kill 6,000,000
Americans, the cost-effectiveness of NMD seems undeniably self-
apparent. Tragically, because of September 1 lth, mass casualties of
237. See O'Hanlon, supra note 117, at 153.
238. See Helprin, supra note 124, at 37.
239. See generally Cordesman, supra note 4.
240. See Nightline Transcript, supra note 170 (statement of Represenative Curt
Weldon).
241. See Helprin, supra note 124, at 38.
Americans can no longer be regarded as either "hypothetical" or
"theoretical." The very thought seems chillingly real, and one that we
should do everything possible to avoid from ever happening again.
The cost-effectiveness argument seems even more unpersuasive when
we include the global economic devastation directly caused by the
September 1 1th attacks. Economists have found that the attacks
triggered a $1.2 trillion decrease in the capital markets in the immediate
aftermath of attack.242 Specifically, the financial services industry
expects a loss of $77 billion directly attributable to September 1 th;
insurance companies expect a loss of $75 billion; media and advertising
companies anticipate a loss of $6 billion; real estate agencies fear a loss
of over $15 billion; retailers and automobile dealers expect a loss of $16
billion; telecom companies are preparing for a loss of $25 billion;
numerous tourism agencies are beginning to go bankrupt with an
expected loss of over $16 billion; and airlines and travel industries have
already felt the effects of a $15 billion loss.
243
Such a precipitous and unprecedented economic drop has real,
tangible effects on the lives of people around the world. As noted by
Supreme Court Justice Stephen G. Breyer, the author of Breaking the
Vicious Cycle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation, only a one percent
increase in unemployment rates over a five year period will generate
19,000 more heart attacks over that time; under the same conditions, the
suicide rate increases by 1,100 over five years. 244 Therefore, although
September l1th will have devastating and long-lasting effects on the
lives of people from across the globe, imagine the costs-human,
financial, spiritual-of one nuclear attack on one American city. If we
can obtain any benefit from September 11 th, let it be by the dismissal of
the increasingly pernicious and transparently deceiving "cost-
effectiveness" argument against NMD. It is clear: NMD is
unquestionably defensible on economic cost-effectiveness grounds.
D. Alleged Flaw IV: NMD Will Destabilize Global Security &
Will Encourage an Arms Race in Asia
Another commonly heard critique of NMD relates to the possible
242. Bill Powell, Economy Under Siege, FORTUNE MAG., Oct. 15, 2001, at 86.
243. Aravind Adiga, Sudden Impact: Adding Up the Costs of September l1th Sector
by Sector, MONEY MAG. Nov. 2001, at 84. See also Michael E. Kanell, Fed Staring at
"Tougher Call" on Short-Term Interest Rates, ATLANTA J. CONST., Dec. 11, 2001, at 1F
(noting that unemployment in the United States rose each month from September 2001
to December 2001); Financial News Staff Writer, Revised GDP Figures Show Economy
in Further Decline, FIN. NEWS, Dec. 2, 2001 (noting that unemployment rose in Japan,
France, and German following September 11 th).
244. STEPHEN G. BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CYCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION 23 (1995).
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reactions Russia, China, and other nations would have to the creation of
NMD. Specifically, some fear that NMD would trigger an escalation in
nuclear missile production because nations would worry about an
American "first-strike" capability. As noted by Deutch, Russia
particularly worries about NMD's effect on its second-strike retaliatory
capability given the reliance it places on nuclear forces.245 Indeed, some
NMD critics suggest that NMD would prompt Russia, "to leave more
warheads on hair trigger-alert because holes in Russia's early warning
system might make it vulnerable to a U.S. first strike and missile
defenses could help the United States thwart a Russian response."
246
Like Russia, China may also fear the effect NMD will have on its
nuclear arsenal, particularly in the context of a potential dispute over
Taiwan. For example, assuming China's nuclear arsenal remains
stagnant, if the United States were to reach CI capability (100
interceptor missiles in Alaska and North Dakota), it would render
China's 20 CSS-4 (single warhead) ICBMs obsolete.247 Moreover, sea-
based NMD (or TMD) systems to defend against North Korea could
elicit Chinese concern as well.248 As a result, some argue that NMD
may precipitate an increase in the rate at which China builds missiles, as
well as encourage them to MIRV their missiles in order to overwhelm
NMD.249
Furthermore, experts maintain that NMD would embolden hawkish
elements within Russia and China, and perhaps even unite these two
nations against the "American hegemony." As a matter of fact, such
emboldenment was attempted when the "hawks" used Secretary
Rumsfeld's May 2001 statement that the Bush NMD plan serves as the
"beginning stages" of American NMD, to imply that, "once built,
245. See Deutch, Brown & White, supra note 116, at 96. See also O'Hanlon, supra
note 117, at 151 (noting "[gliven the poor state of Russia's nuclear forces and early-
warning networks, only a very small fraction of its START I-constrained nuclear
arsenal might in theory survive a U.S. strike, making even a modest defense theoretically
potent against it .... START II limits-which require that land-based missiles each
have only one warhead-could leave Russia with perhaps only 200 survivable
warheads.., deploying NMD could rekindle Russian paranoia about strategic
inferiority, possibly halting offensive arms control and persuading Moscow to retain
decrepit, dangerous nuclear weapons systems it really should retire.").
246. See Mufson & Milbank, supra note 53, at Al.
247. See Thompson, supra note 59, at 28; see also Deutch, Brown & White, supra
note 116, at 98 (remarking that plans for C1 capability "suggest the intent to build a
system that can negate a Chinese attack.").
248. Id.
249. See Lewis, supra note 102, at 135-36.
[NMD] will continue to expand until it is robust enough to thwart
attacks from anyone. ',250  Among the fears Secretary Rumsfeld's
comment incited were those concerning space and satellite technology.
Some speculate that Russian and Chinese officials fear that the "end
stages" of NMD will include destruction of their satellite capabilities. 25'
In fact, the head of the Russian Security Council has recently cautioned
that NMD would lead to the destruction of stability, and to a new
powerful spiral of the arms race, particularly in space.
Likewise, some have interpreted the July 15, 2001 "Strategic
Partnership" Treaty signed between Russian President Vladimir Putin
and Chinese Leader Jiang Zemin as evidence of NMD's encouragement
of this very phenomenon. In fact, the Partnership Treaty, which signifies
the first China-Soviet Treaty since 1950, vows to create "a new
international order" to counter U.S. unipolarity and American NMD 3
As part of this "new international order," Russia will sell to China SU-
30 MKK and SU-27 fighter-bombers, four diesel submarines and two
Sovremenny-class destroyers armed with Moskit anti-ship missiles-all
weapons that could be used by China in the Taiwan Strait.254 According
to Professor Vilya Gelbras of the Institute of Asian and African Studies
at Moscow State University, the Partnership Treaty reflects a more
receptive political audience for bellicose Chinese and Russian officials
who seek to demonstrate to "the United States that there are two
countries that Uoin] together against the United States. 255
Most recently, when President Bush made his December 13th "Intent
to Withdraw from the ABM Treaty" announcement, hawkish and
nationalistic elements within Russia were quick to take advantage of the
opportunity to decry the burgeoning "American nuclear hegemony." For
instance, Alexei Arbatov, Deputy Chairman of the Duma's Committee
on Defense, argued that because of the American withdrawal from the
ABM Treaty, Russia should withdraw from the START II Treaty, and
plan to build more ICBMs with multiple warheads.256 Similarly,
Mikhail Margelov, Chairman of the Federation Council's Committee on
250. See Thompson, supra note 59, at 26 & 28. Secretary Rumsfeld said "this is not
the old Star Wars idea of a shield that will keep everything off of everyone in the
world ... it is something that in the beginning stages is designed to deal with handfuls of
these things and persuade people that they're not going to be able to blackmail and
intimidate the U.S. and its allies." Id.
251. See Chollet and Goldgeier, supra note 172.
252. See Schweid, supra note 54.
253. Susan B. Glasser, Presidents of China, Russia Sign Pact, WASH. POST, July 17,
2001 at A13; see also Tanks, supra note 206.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Sharon LaFraniere, Putin Calls ABM Move 'Mistaken,' WASH. POST, Dec. 14,
2001, at A40.
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International Relations, maintained that Russia now had "a free hand" in
deciding the composition of its nuclear forces, and it would now be free
to reverse early decisions to eliminate missiles.257
On the other hand, some find that both the Partnership Treaty and the
ABM Treaty are, in the eyes of Beijing and, to a lesser extent Moscow,
less reflective of NMD and more indicative of the general insecurities
258felt by Russian and Chinese leaders in a world with one superpower.
In addition to potentially encouraging increased missile production and
enhanced unity between China and Russia, the creation of NMD would,
in the belief of its opponents, trigger a "secondary" arms races as well.
For instance, NMD could set off a significant ripple effect worldwide. 259
It follows that if China and Russia were to increase their nuclear
production in response to NMD, buildups could then be triggered in
India and Pakistan. Additionally, if NMD triggers an increase in
Chinese missile production, India might feel obligated to increase its
own production, which in turn would encourage Pakistan, etc.
260
On the other hand, from the standpoint of both history and common
sense, the argument that NMD will somehow encourage an arms race
that would otherwise not occur seems implausible. Most importantly,
the greatest arms race in global history occurred when there was no
defense against missiles. Indeed, the "Cold War" featured a precipitous
and dangerous contest between the United States and the U.S.S.R. over
which nation could possess the most powerful nuclear arsenal. In this
respect, it appears hard to imagine that NMD will somehow trigger a
more rapid arms race.
From the standpoint of common sense, we should ask the following
two questions: a) would Russia still possess second-strike capacity even
if the United States achieved C3 NMD technology; and b) would China
pursue a nuclear arsenal with any less vigor if the United States elected
notto pursue NMD? The answer to the first question seems obvious: if
257. Id.
258. See also Tanks, supra note 206. "For their countries to gain more leverage in
the international arena, the current unipolar must change. Consequently, their declared
polices are to work toward the establishment of a multipolar international structure...
their actions in providing missile and/or other military assistance to China, India, Iran,
Iraq, Syria, Libya, and other states, along with efforts to use bilateral arms control
agreements to limit U.S. power, are consistent with the stated multipolar policy
objectives." Id.
259. See Landay, supra note 111, at 4.
260. See Thompson, supra note 59, at 28.
Russia never builds another missile, and the United States deploys
NMD, the United States would still be unable to stop an all-out Russian
first strike. 261
The answer to the second question appears equally intuitive. One
commentator believes that China would take on a more aggressive
disposition in pursuing a nuclear arsenal if they believed that the United
States would not pursue real deterrence and therefore not make Chinese
,,262Moevinvestments in missile technology "losing propositions. Moreover,
some note that China would not lose a deterrent if the United States
installed NMD because China does not have a deterrent against the
United States today, presumably because it does not believe it needs
one. 263 In other words, if Chinese leaders were sincerely worried about a
nuclear attack from the United States, they would have secured a better
264
nuclear arsenal than the one they currently possess. Most practically,
despite the anti-NMD rhetoric often expressed by Chinese leaders,
Cordesman believes "the Taiwan Straits Crisis may do more to
encourage China to increase its threat against the US than NMD.
2 65
Finally, Russia and China's belief that NMD serves as a destabilizing
mechanism to global affairs seems particularly hypocritical to some,
including Secretary Rumsfeld, for both nations have been active
exporters of nuclear materials to questionable and unstable leaderships
around the globe. Not surprisingly, Secretary Rumsfeld has remarked,
"the ironic thing is that [Russia and China] are actively creating a more
dangerous world through the proliferation of [missile] technology,
complaining and protesting that the United States has decided that it
thinks that it is in our best interest to provide a capability to defend
against those various technologies. Their argument is that it is
destabilizing. What is destabilizing is proliferation.,, 266 Similarly, one
can argue that NMD poses no threat to either Russia or China, unless
either nation considers its proliferation of weapons to be an extension of
national interests.267
V. ARGUMENTS FOR NMD: EXPANDING DETERRENCE
Although one can persuasively defend NMD by refuting the claims of
the critics, observing how NMD deters a variety of possible nuclear
261. See Krauthammer, supra note 42, at 21.
262. See Gaffney, supra note 106.
263. See Barry, supra note 75.
264. Id. "China's current nuclear arsenal consists of aging, static, highly vulnerable,
liquid fuelled ICBMs is proof of that."
265. See Cordesman, supra note 4, at 7.
266. See Lopez, supra note 180.
267. See generally Cordesman, supra note 4.
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attacks on the global community may best demonstrate the critical
importance of NMD.
A. Benefit I: NMD May Prevent Accidental & Unauthorized Launches
While many NMD proponents and opponents debate whether the
United States needs a system of missile defense to protect against an
enemy attack, fewer address an equally worrisome scenario: an
accidental or unauthorized launch by any nation-friend or foe-against
the United States or ally. In fact, if a British submarine were to
accidentally launch a nuclear missile directed towards the United States,
we would have zero defense to stop it.
268
Not only do accidental launches present a major concern to American
security, but unauthorized launches may prove even more troubling. In
particular, the destabilization of the Russian military program has
triggered anxiety in many observers. 269 To illustrate how dangerous the
command and control of the Russian nuclear program has become,
Michael Krepon, President of the Henry L. Stimson Center, notes that in
April 1999, a nuclear-powered attack submarine was temporarily
overtaken by a deranged sailor who had killed several of his shipmates
in order to gain control. 7°
In fact, the Russian nuclear instability was best seen in January 1995,
when Russian officials believed that they may have been under nuclear
attack, and President Boris Yeltsin had to activate his "nuclear
briefcase" to prepare to enter launch codes. The "attack," however, was
nothing more than a scientific research missile that had been launched
by Norway. If Russia's apparent overreaction to a Norwegian scientific
research missile was not enough, the launching of the research missile
was part of a routine practice, and in December 1994, Norwegian
officials had told their Russian counterparts of the precise date, time, and271
nature of the scientific missile launch.. Most alarmingly, one Russian
268. See Murdock, supra note 2.
269. See Weldon, supra note 100, at 12. For instance, Congressman Weldon finds
that, "the command and control of [Russian] nuclear weapons have grown frighteningly
unstable .... Russian strategic forces are so short on money they have to hire out soldiers
for digging potatoes, leaving some nuclear missile sites shorthanded and requiring some
crews to work double shifts [or] entrusting nuclear weapons to youths who are suffering
malnutrition .... Russian soldiers possess little or no sense of loyalty to the
government." Id.
270. See Krepon, supra note 7, at 32.
271. See Weldon, supra note 100.
diplomat has chillingly acknowledged, "there are many incidents like
this that no one knows about.,
272
Therefore, even if a rogue state or terrorist group never launches a
nuclear missile at the United States or an ally, the presence of a defense
against an accidental or unauthorized attack may alone validate NMD.
We may ask, "is it rational to have zero defense against an accidental or
unauthorized launch?, 273 The answer seems clear, as if such a scenario
actually happened, President Bush would deal with it by doing nothing
because there is nothing he could do. 4 Consequently, in order to
ensure deterrence against these scenarios, NMD is needed.
Finally, NMD would provide a flexible, perhaps more moral response
to an unauthorized or accidental launch. That is, imagine that a Russian
nuclear submarine was seized by a group of renegade officers, and those
officers decided to launch a nuclear missile at an American city.
Without NMD, the President would be under enormous political
pressure to retaliate against Russia---even though Russia had not
authorized the attack. With NMD, however, the President could simply
intercept the missile and Russia could retaliate against its own renegade
sailors. NMD would not only save the innocent lives of those who
would perish in the unauthorized or accidental launch, but also the
innocent lives of those who would perish in the retaliation.
B. Benefit II: NMD Does Not Disturb "Security" Offered By
Mutually Assured Destruction Because It Does Not
Encourage A "First-Strike"
Despite the protestations of Russian and Chinese leaders, NMD will
not threaten their ability to obliterate the United States. In other words,
even though most experts conclude "mutually assured destruction"
(MAD) no longer applies to global national security, the Bush
Administration has made clear the NMD will be limited and thus unable
to stop an all out Russian or Chinese nuclear attack. In essence, as Dr.
Rice makes clear, "we are not in the same environment that we were in
the 1970s and 1980s [NMD is a defense against a few nuclear
weapons] ... [n]ow the emerging threats are from rogue states or from
accidental launching. 275 Similarly, European leaders, such as Czech
Republic President Vaclav Havel, recognize that, "the new world we are
272. Id.
273. John Norton Moore, Director, Center for National Security Law, Lecture on
National Security Law lecture at the University of Virginia School of Law (Apr. 9, 2001)
(on file with author).
274. See Henry J. Hyde, No More Pearl Harbors, CHI. TRIB., June 3, 2001, at C17.
275. Condolezza Rice, "Condoleezza Rice Says...," NAT'L REV. ONLINE, at 1 (June
22, 2000), available at htp'J/www.nationalreview.com/interrogatory/interrogatory062200 html.
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entering cannot be based on mutually assured destruction.. .An
increasingly important role should be played by defense systems. 276
Even Russian President Vladimir Putin admits, "[i]t is hard not to agree
with President Bush that the world is changing rapidly and new threats
are now appearing.,
277
Before describing how NMD deters the modem threat of rogue states
and terrorist groups, it is first worth debunking fears that deterrence
offered by MAD will be jeopardized by NMD. In general, MAD was a
Cold War logic based upon the premise that "if either side can always
launch a second strike against the other, then neither side will ever
launch a first. 278 American concerns that Russia could gain first strike
capability precipitated President Reagan's vision for SDI, which would
have, in his own words, "prevented the Soviets from gaining first strike
capability and holding the world hostage." 279 Even in the height of the
Cold War "the idea of a first strike remained quite fantastic because it
meant initiating the most destructive war in human history," though such
a scenario was not wholly unbelievable as, "the United States and the
Soviet Union were mortal ideological enemies.' 28°
Importantly, however, many feared that missile defenses (namely
SDI) would tip the apparent security balance offered by MAD, and
therefore change national incentives in a way to encourage a first strike
(to prevent the other side from striking first).28' Indeed, Safeguard was
engineered to deter a Soviet first strike.282
To the extent MAD was a valid analysis of national security during
the Cold War, and to the extent such logic remains applicable today, the
Bush Administration has taken great pains to alleviate any worries that
NMD will resemble either Safeguard or the concept of SDI. Most
importantly, the Administration has emphasized that NMD will provide
only limited defense, capable of stopping missiles in the numbers of
fives or perhaps tens-but not hundreds, and certainly not thousands.
That is, NMD will be designed neither to deter either Russia or China
from launching a first strike against us nor enable us to launch a first
276. See Drozdiak and Milbank, supra note 58, at 5.
277. See Thompson, supra note 59, at 28.
278. See Krauthammer, supra note 42, at 22.
279. Biography: Ronald Reagan (Arts & Entertainment television broadcast, 2001).
280. See Krauthammer, supra note 42, at 22-23.
281. Id.
282. See William J. Broad, Clinton's Missile Decision: The History, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 2, 2000, at A9.
strike against them.
To demonstrate that NMD will not threaten either Russia or China,
American leaders have vocally expressed that NMD should not be
confused with previous missile defense systems. For example, Secretary
of State Powell recently attempted to pacify the Chinese by assuring that
NMD will not be able to stop a complete nuclear attack by China, even
going so far to note that "[China] may even double the number of their
missiles aimed at the U.S." because NMD is not being designed with a
threat from a country like China in mind.283  Likewise, Secretary
Rumsfeld has stressed, "[t]his isn't the old Star Wars idea of a shield that
will keep everything off of everyone in the world... [NMD] is designed
to... persuade people that they're not going to be able to blackmail and
intimidate the U.S. and its allies. 284  In fact, officials in the Bush
Administration suggest that a tacit agreement with China allowing it to
have enough nuclear weapons to trump NMD is the only way to show
China that NMD is not a threat to its nuclear arsenal.285
Even though NMD will not undermine MAD, critics of NMD, such as
Professor Lewis, argue that NMD should nevertheless be avoided
because it will "threaten" Russia and China and thereby endanger the
United States: "NMD would provoke deep suspicion in Russia and
China, likely increase the risk of a Russian accidental or unauthorized
launch, and undermine existing nonproliferation efforts worldwide. 286
With respect to China, some implicitly corroborate Professor Lewis'
belief by observing that since President Bush announced his NMD plans,
the Chinese leadership has become more adversarial in its rhetoric
towards the United States. For instance, in May 2001, a Chinese official
alleged that President Bush "has [already] violated the ABM Treaty,
which will destroy the balance of international security forces and could
cause a new arms race. ' ' 87 A related concern for the Chinese rests in
possible United States engagement with Russia on NMD, for it may
trigger feelings of Chinese "isolation., 288  More specifically, even
limited rapprochement with Russia on NMD would raise fears among
Chinese leaders that they were being "frozen out" and that the
rapprochement's hidden purpose was to contain their modest nuclear
283. See Thompson, supra note 59, at 32.
284. Id. at 31-32.
285. Id. See also Tanks, supra note 206 (noting that "NMD will not be capable of
stopping a large attack... [but] will ensure that if China wants to threaten Los Angeles,
it will have to fire enough missiles to justify the complete destruction of China when we
fire back.").
286. Lewis, supra note 102, at 130 & 132-35.
287. See Thompson, supra note 59, at 28.
288. Philip P. Pan, Jiang Doges Query on Missile Shield, WASH. POST, Aug. 9,
2001, at AI4.
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force. 289  Unlike Russian officials, Chinese officials have remained
steadfast in their total opposition to NMD. To illustrate this point, in
August, 2001, Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian told a group of
U.S. senators that there were, "no grounds" for the development of
NMD as it would be, "detrimental to trust among nations around the
world. 29°
In reality, however, Professor Lewis' concern about NMD encouraging
China to rapidly increase their nuclear arsenal proves incompatible with
recent trends in the Chinese nuclear program. Simply put, China will
continue to develop its own nuclear program irrespective of NMD.
Indeed, China deployed most of its 20 or so CSS-4 ICBMs during the
Clinton Administration, and expanded its mobile, solid-fueled ICBM
program, even though most observers regarded President Clinton as an
NMD opponent.29' In other words, if President Bush abandoned NMD
tomorrow and Congress passed a law preventing any future president
from pursuing NMD, would China really halt their nuclear program?
Would China, which, in the words of Director Deutch, has endeavored to
"grow" their ICBM force with great speed, even delay their nuclear
advancement? 292 As noted by Gaffney, China will build their nuclear
arsenal, "whether we remain defenseless or not. 293  Presently, in a
world without NMD, China is seeking to triple its long-range nuclear
294
capabilities. More persuasively, and as noted earlier, Gaffney
believes that abandoning NMD will accelerate the Chinese nuclear
program for, "China will have a greater incentive [to build their arsenal]
if they need not fear defenses that will make such investments losing
,,295propositions.
289. David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, U.S. Plans Offer to Russia to End ABM
Treaty Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2001, at Al.
290. See Pan, supra note 288; see also Donald Devine, Prelude to rapproachment?,
WASH. TIMES. May 25, 2001, at 20. Even American experts, such as Donald Devine,
former Director of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management under President Nixon,
believe that President Bush's true motivation is to "go to Russia to contain China. An
American tie to Russia... stops China's planned alliance with Russia and India."
291. Baker Spring, Myths about Missile Defense and the Arms Race, HERITAGE
FOUND. BACKGROUNDER No. 1385, July 13, 2000, at 5, available at
http://www.heritage.org/library/backgrounder/bg1385.html.
292. See Deutch, Brown & White, supra note 116, at 92.
293. See Gaffney, supra note 106.
294. See Helprin, supra note 124, at 38.
295. See Gaffney, supra note 106.
Russia, however, seems less embracive of either the logic of MAD or
the danger posed by NMD. First, some speculate that Russian officials
believe NMD is a waste of American money, and it would like to see
nothing more than its former adversaries pursue another "Star Wars. 296
Second, as noted by Chollet and Goldgeier, President Bush's greatest
hurdle in withdrawing from the ABM Treaty and in pursing NMD may
be to pitch NMD as a way to preserve Russia's status as a superpower.
Third, Russia would benefit from a relaxation of the ABM Treaty as it is
presently trying to upgrade its S-300 missiles to the S-400 missiles,
which would be guided by a radar system in violation of the ABM
Treaty.298
To the extent the Russians and the Chinese really believe that NMD
will serve as a "backdoor" to American first strike capability, President
Bush has pledged to link NMD with nuclear arms reduction-even
vowing to unilaterally reduce the United States' 7,200 nuclear weapon
stockpile. In fact, in July, President Bush and President Putin agreed to
begin negotiations on supplanting the ABM Treaty with a missile
defense shield and link it to bilateral cuts in nuclear stockpiles;299 more
recently, President Bush told Chinese President Jiang Zemin that the
United States would even reduce its stockpile to a level of 1,000-
1,500-a number large enough to deter a Russian or Chinese first strike,
but likely too small to threaten either Russia or China with an American
first strike. °°
The linkage between NMD and arms control reached a new level on
November 1, 2001, when the United States and Russia reached a
preliminary agreement that both countries would reduce their number of
strategic warheads to between 1,750 and 2,250-numbers even lower
than the 3,000 to 3,500 set under START 11. 301 Perhaps even more
significantly, the parties agreed that the ABM Treaty would not preclude
either party from engaging in vigorous missile defense testing. On
November 14, 2001, both leaders signed this preliminary agreement
during the leaders' "Crawford Summit" in Crawford, Texas.
296. See Thompson, supra note 59, at 28 (noting "Russian officials also
acknowledge they won't mind if the U.S. pumps hundreds of billions of dollars into a
scheme they think will never work.").
297. See Chollet and Goldgeier, supra note 172.
298. See Sanger and Shanker, supra note 289.
299. See Curl, supra note 61. See also Barry, supra note 75 (noting that U.S. would
also share intelligence and welcome joint efforts to counter proliferation).
300. See Thompson, supra note 59, at 28. See also Chollet and Goldgeier, supra
note 172.
301. Walter Pincus and Alan Sipress, Missile Defense Deal is Likely, WASH. POST,
Nov. 1, 2001, at A01.
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The greatest evidence of Russia's recognition that MAD no longer
exists may have been detected by the muted criticism President Putin
offered in response to President Bush's December 13, 2001 decision to
withdraw from the ABM Treaty on May 13, 2002. President Putin only
stated that the United States was "mistaken" in its decision, as there
would now be a "legal vacuum" in arms control.3 °z At the same time,
however, President Putin emphasized that the decision would not
threaten Russia's national security because Russia and the United States
are now on friendly terms: "the present level of bilateral cooperation
between Russia and the United States should not only be preserved but
also used for quickly working out new frameworks of strategic
cooperation. 30 3  Most importantly, President Putin announced that
Russia would offer a plan to reduce each side's strategic nuclear arsenals
to a range between 1,500 and 2,200 warheads-even lower than the
1,700 to 2,200 range proposed by President Bush at the Crawford
Summit in November 2001. 304
Observers were quick to characterize President Putin's remarks as
intended to downplay the impact of the U.S. decision to abandon a treaty
that the Kremlin has repeatedly called a cornerstone of nuclear
deterrence. Indeed, Secretary Powell highlighted the political
significance of President Putin offering arms reduction on the very same
day President Bush effectively announced the development of a
comprehensive ABM system that could provide extended protection for
both American and Russian soil: "[an] arms race has not been set off by
the United States' indicating its intention to withdraw from the ABM
Treaty. Quite the contrary." To further illustrate how MAD no longer
applies to U.S.-Russian relations, when President Bush visits Moscow in
the Spring of 2002, he is expected to sign President Putin's arms control
offer. 06
Significantly, even opponents to President Bush recognize the
important progress achieved by the Bush Administration in removing
diplomatic and political obstacles to NMD. For instance, Senator
Daschle admits the President "appears to have been successful" in
persuading President Putin to agree that the ABM Treaty should not
302. See LaFraniere, supra note 256.




interfere with NMD.3 °7 Likewise, political commentators sense that
President Bush has correctly perceived that "Russia does not define itself
as our existential adversary. It no longer sees its mission as the abolition
of our very way of life. ' °8 Importantly, therefore, by integrating
Russia's transformation from a repressive regime to a fellow democratic
nation into his larger argument that MAD no longer proves relevant,
President Bush has implicitly endorsed the Democratic Peace; a theory
led by Professor John Norton Moore, which finds that democracies do
not fight other democracies (e.g. since from 1816 to date, no democratic
nation has initiated a major war or fought another democracy). 309 As a
result, once Russia completes its democratic revolution, the Democratic
Peace will replace MAD as the means for ensuring peace.
In summary, Russia's guarded desire to preserve MAD appears based
far more on sentimental feelings than on national security concerns. In
fact, Russia's pursuit of ABM Treaty-banned missile defense
technology, its avowed openness to "vigorous testing" of NMD
technology, and its support for greater arms reduction in conjunction
with expanded missile defense strongly suggest that it values its
concerns for the 2 1st Century as far more important than espousing now
extinct 20th Century logic. Indeed, as Russia becomes a democracy, it
will only continue to acquire more and more of the Democratic Peace.
1. Illustrative NMD Hypothetical: NMD Discourages First Strikes1 °
As a final point to cement the notion that NMD would not disturb
either the Russian or the Chinese capacity to respond to an American
first-strike (and thus there is no reason to believe that NMD would
encourage an American first strike), consider the following hypothetical
based on probable circumstances. Assume that in the year 2008, the
United States deploys a limited NMD system that, in intercepting
ICBMs launched at North America, has the capacity to stop 75 ICBMs,
and has an effectiveness rate of 60%; alternatively, in intercepting
ICBMs launched at Europe and Asia, it has the capacity to stop 35
ICBMS and has an effectiveness rate of 45% (thus giving it some,
though limited, "extended deterrence" capability). Assume also that
both the United States and Russia each have 2,200 ICBMs, while China
has 40, and that all three nations' ICBMs effectively hit their targets
70% of the time. Finally, assume that because President Bush's NMD
307. See Curl, supra note 55, at A12.
308. See Krauthammer, supra note 42, at 23.
309. R.J. RUMMEL, DEATH BY GOVERNMENT 2 (1994) (noting that a "major war"
consists of 1,000 or more combatant deaths).
310. For Statistical & Mathematical Summary of NMD First Strike Hypothetical,
please see Appendix.
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system will likely employ "boost-phase" technology, that is, it will
intercept ICBMs as they are launched, meaning that some of the ICBMs
it destroys would not have reached their targets had they not been
intercepted (since, in this illustration, ICBMs hit their targets 70% of the
time).
In what will be called "Scenario I," assume that all three nations
employ unmirved ICBMs. In this scenario, the United States decides to
launch a first-strike at Russia. If the United States launches 200 of its
ICBMs, 140 ICBMs would successfully hit their Russian targets (since
American ICBMs hit their targets 70% of the time and Russia does not
have NMD). If Russia responded by launching 200 ICBMs, 109 ICBMs
would successfully hit their American targets (since NMD would
intercept 45 ICBMs at boost phase, for it has the capacity to intercept
60% of 75 of the 200 ICBMs launched at North America. Therefore,
155 of the ICBMs would continue on their flight, and 70% of them
would hit their targets). Clearly, NMD would not encourage an
American first strike of Russia in Scenario 1, as this example shows how
NMD offers only limited defense. Consequently, even when using
single warheads, a remarkably restrained Russian response to a first
strike would easily overwhelm NMD.
In "Scenario II," assume again that all three nations employ unmirved
ICBMs. In this scenario, the United States decides to launch a first-
strike at China. As in Scenario I, if the United States launches 200 of its
ICBMs, 140 ICBMs would successfully hit their targets. If China
responded by launching all of its 40 ICBMs, 11 would hit their
American targets (since NMD would intercept 24 ICBMs, and, of the
remaining 16, 70% would hit their targets). Therefore, as with a first
strike at Russia, NMD would clearly not encourage an American first
strike at China, unless an American president was willing to sacrifice 11
cities.
Alternatively, consider "Scenario i," which employs identical
circumstances to Scenario II, except that let us assume the United States'
first strike was able to destroy 25 of China's 40 ICBMs before China
could deploy its arsenal. In this scenario, China's second strike would
consist of only 15 ICBMs, and of those 15, only 4 would hit their targets
(since NMD would intercept 9 ICBMs, and 70% of the remaining 6
would hit their targets). Again, however, would an American President
be willing to sacrifice even 4 cities in order to launch a first strike at
China? The answer seems self-evident. Furthermore, if China deployed
mirved ICBMs (which it will likely possess), carrying 10 warheads each,
and just 4 ICBMs broke the NMD shield, 40 warheads-not 4-would
hit their American sites.
Finally, and most telling, consider "Scenario IV," where China
decides to launch a first strike at Russia using all of its 40 weapons, all
of which are mirved with 10 warheads each. Given the geographic
proximity of these nations, and given that all of the Chinese ICBMs are
mirved in this scenario, we shall assume that the Chinese leadership
believes (probably mistakenly) that they have just enough first strike
capacity to obliterate all of Russia's 2200 ICBMs before Russia could
mount a response.
In this setting, an American NMD system that provides extended
deterrence would discourage a first strike: without NMD, 28 of China's
ICBMs, and 280 of its warheads would hit their Russian targets (since
the ICBMs hit their targets 70% of the time, and each missile has 10
warheads each); with NMD, however, 17 of China's ICBMs, and 170 of
its warheads would hit their Russian targets (since the American NMD
can attempt to intercept 35 of China's 40 ICBMs, at an effectiveness rate
of 45%, 16 ICBMs would be initially intercepted). Therefore, 24
ICBMs would continue on their flight patterns and would hit their
targets 70% of the time. As a result, even an American NMD providing
limited extended deterrence would stop 110 Chinese warheads from
hitting Russian soil-thus likely discouraging a Chinese first strike.
Clearly, this illustration turns the "NMD will only encourage a first
strike" on its head, as the numbers suggest the very opposite conclusion.
In fact, the presence of NMD appears to offer no increase in incentives
for either the United States or Russia to launch a first strike, as a limited
NMD system would offer inconsequential defense against an even
limited response to a first-strike. Instead, NMD appears to decrease
incentives for a Chinese first strike on Russia, thus providing a benefit of
particular importance to Russia as it continues its transformation into a
democracy.
C. Benefit III: NMD Addresses the Rising Nuclear Threat Posed By
Rogue States: Increasing the $$ Price of Admission to
the Rogue State Club
Of all the reasons for the deployment of NMD discussed in this
comment, none may be more important than bolstering the presently
non-existent defense against a missile attack from a rogue state such as
North Korea, Iran, or Iraq. Over the next five to twenty years, these
nations will likely acquire the capacity to launch a nuclear missile at the
United States or an ally, though most experts agree that these nations
will possess only a handful of missiles, if not fewer. However, with zero
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defense, only one missile will do the job.
Therefore, NMD, a missile defense system designed to stop a limited
number of missiles, serves as the perfect deterrence to those countries
with so few weapons to deploy: they would achieve greater value by
holding onto their weapons rather than firing them and risk them being
destroyed by NMD. Professor Nicholas Rostow of the U.S. Naval War
College maintains that deployment of NMD will reduce proliferation
incentives and will discourage rogue countries from acquiring potential
missiles. 31  Equally important, as Cordesman asserts, totalitarian
regimes, such as those found in Iran and North Korea, may not be
deterred by offensive retaliatory capabilities, thus placing greater value
in NMD as the most effective form of extended deterrence against a
nuclear attack.31 2
Remarkably, NMD opponents, such as Spurgeon Keeny, president of
the Arms Control Association, seemingly ignore indisputable evidence
that rogue states are rapidly expanding their nuclear arms programs, and
instead find "a lack of a credible urgent threat from so-called rogue
states."313 Most experts agree, however, that Iraq, Iran, and, most
importantly, North Korea, will soon have the capacity to launch nuclear
weapons at the United States or its allies-if they do not already have
the capacity to do so. For instance, Saddam Hussein, particularly as
sanctions on Iraq have eroded, has begun developing missile technology
that could soon allow him to hit European capitals or, more imminently,
Israel.3t 4 Notably, as Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz asks,
"just imagine how the Gulf War would have proceeded if Saddam
Hussein had long-range missiles capable of targeting the capitals of our
allies in Europe or in Asia?
' 315
Similarly, Iran has been working at developing a nuclear missile
system, and experts conclude that Iran could have a ballistic missile
system as early as 2005.316 Equally troubling, Joseph A. Bosco,
Professor of Foreign Relations at Georgetown University, has noted that
311. Nicholas Rostow, Professor, U.S. Naval War College, Presentation at the New
England School of Law's International Law Forum (Nov. 8, 2001) (on file with author).
312. See Cordesman, supra note 4.
313. See Schweid, supra note 54.
314. See Barry, supra note 75.
315. See Nightline Transcript, supra note 170 (statement by Deputy Defense
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz).
316. See Deutch, Brown & White, supra note 116, at 93.
China has transferred essential missile technology to Iran.3 17 Moreover,
Secretary Rumsfeld believes that Russia has aided Iran by providing it
missile technology and technology for weapons of mass destruction. 318
Of all the rogue states, however, North Korea and its burgeoning
nuclear arms program poses the most dangerous threat to the security
and safety of the Free World. Since August 31, 1998, when North Korea
test launched the Taepo Dong-1 missile over the skies of Japan, the Free
World learned that North Korea had the intercontinental range to launch
a nuclear missile.319 In describing the magnitude of this threat, one
commentator warned, "if North Korea-bankrupt, primitive, starving,
isolated, paranoid North Korea-could develop something close to an
ICBM, the world really was a more threatening place than it had
seemed. 32 °
The current threat posed by the Taepo-Dong cannot be overlooked.
As noted by Director Deutch, "North Korea [now] has a system that
could reach the United States." 321  Indeed, the Taepo-Dong test
demonstrated that North Korea could currently launch a missile (with a
very small payload) capable of hitting the coast of Alaska-and even
NMD opponents like Gronlund and Wright concede this point.322 Other
NMD opponents, such as Professor Lewis, admit the Taepo-Dong test
"fundamentally altered the missile defense debate... [it] undercut the
[Clinton] [Aidministration's key argument against an immediate
decision to deploy an NMD system-namely, that the United States
would have adequate warning before deployment.' 32 3  In fact,
immediately after Taepo-Dong test, Japan quickly agreed to enter into a
TMD research collaboration with the United States.3  Likewise, experts
conclude that President Bush will seek to deploy a boost phase sea-based
NMD system in the Sea of Japan, primarily because the U.S. intelligence
325community considers a potential North Korean threat most imminent.
The depth of the North Korean nuclear program deserves further
mention. First, North Korea maintains a large quantity of uranium, with
317. Joseph A. Bosco, Has China Turned Into a Frankenstein?, L.A. TIMES,
Opinion Editorial, Mar. 5, 2001, at B7.
318. See Lopez, supra note 180; see e.g., Agence France Presse Staff Writer, US
Concerned about Russian-Iranian Military Ties, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 4, 2001(on file with author). On October 2, 2001, Russia agreed to sell to Iran $300 million
worth of conventional arms, while also delivering the first reactor for the Iranian nuclear
power station in Busheher, Iran.
319. See Barry, supra note 75.
320. Id.
321. See Deutch, Brown & White, supra note 116, at 92.
322. See Gronlund & Wright, supra note 102, at 47.
323. See Lewis, Gronlund & Wright, supra note 102, at 122.
324. See O'Hanlon, supra note 117, at 149.
325. Id.
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North Korean uranium mines offering four million tons of exploitable
high-quality uranium.326 Second, North Korea has likely made progress
on the Taepo Dong 2, a rocket four times as powerful as its predecessor,
and with the capacity to reach the continental United States.
327
North Korean leadership's proven deceitfulness may offer the most
troubling concern. Indeed, Kim Jong I1 and the North Korean leadership
have consistently violated treaties. Most significantly, on October 21,
1994, North Korea and the United States signed an "Agreement
Framework., 328 Essentially, the Framework involved an exchange: in
return for North Korea halting its nuclear weapons program, the United
States would provide half a million tons of free heavy-fuel every year
and the United States would fund construction of two "safe" light-water
nuclear reactors, on North Korean soil, worth well over $4 billion.329
Incredibly, as Nicholas Eberstadt, author of End of North Korea points
out, the American negotiators did not require verification as a condition
of the Framework.33  Not surprisingly, by August 1998, the Central
Intelligence Agency had discovered "a huge secret underground
complex in North Korea," that might be "the centerpiece of an effort to
revive the country's nuclear weapons program" and since that time,
North Korea has refused inspection of the facility, offering entrance to
the facility in exchange for $300 million.33' And while the United States
provided over $5 billion in aid and technology to the North Korean
government, that same government provided the United States with yet
another reason to harbor distrust towards their motivations.
Not only should this concern worry the United States and it allies, but
experts note that Russia and China may already be in range of North
Korean nuclear weapons. In fact, North Korea has missiles that could
easily strike the Russian Far East. Interestingly, the rapid advancement
of North Korea's nuclear program owes part of its success to the
Russians, who, as we have seen, are quickly becoming converts to the
value of NMD. Indeed, Director Deutch finds, "the pace of [rogue state
326. Federation of American Scientists on North Korea, North Korean Nuclear
Weapons Program, at 1, available at http://www.fas.org/news/dprk/ (last visited on Feb.
20, 2002).
327. See O'Hanlon, supra note 117, at 148.
328. See Federation of American Scientists on North Korea, supra note 326, at 3.




missile programs] depends significantly on assistance from other
countries [such as] Russia and China., 332
Undoubtedly, North Korea will continue to work towards acquiring
the capability to destroy any city on Earth. As noted earlier, the North
Korean leadership has consistently violated nuclear development
treaties, thereby placing the government of North Korea amongst one of
the most corrupt regimes in modem history. At the same time, the North
Korean leadership has closely monitored the American debate over
missile defense, particularly when NMD opponents are vocal in their
opposition. In fact, on September 14, 2001, North Korea's Central
Broadcasting Radio Station featured a segment on Senator Biden's
opposition to NMD, noting that the Senate Foreign Relations Chairman
stressed in a speech at the National Reporters' Club "that he still opposes
Bush's plan to breach the ABM Treaty... he criticized that US
President Bush's plan to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile
[ABM] Treaty will become a complete disaster., 333  One can only
conclude that so long as the North Korean leadership believes President
Bush does not have the requisite political support for NMD, this
leadership will continue to be undeterred by the non-existent American
missile defense.
Should the North Korean leadership gain confidence from comments
made by Senator Biden and others, the United States' fear of North
Korea should only rise. After all, a great deal of evidence suggests that
the North Korean leadership is one of the most paranoid and democidal
in human history.334 Should North Korea succeed in constructing the
Taepo Dong 2, and thus gain the capacity to hit perhaps any U.S. city, a
question posited by Tanks appears even more ominous, "[w]ho can say
what a dying regime might do [if it had nuclear weapons]. 335 As a
332. See Deutch, Brown & White, supra note 116, at 92-93; see also Helprin, supra
note 113, at 34 (remarking that "most arms competitions are not simply rivalries between
two parties unaffected by other influences); Lopez, supra note 180. Russia has provided
financing and technology to the Iranian missile program, and Iran has done the same to
the North Korean missile program-a cycle validating Secretary Rumsfeld's point that
the rise of the rogue state missile threat originates mostly from Russia's nuclear
proliferation: "if Russia helps Iran, Iran does not necessarily have to take an oath that
they'll never take those same technologies and give them to anybody else. And over
time Iran could decide to give those technologies to someone who could in fact threaten
Russia."
333. BBC Monitoring, North Korean Radio on US Committee Chairman's
Opposition to Missile Defense, source Central Broadcasting Station, Pyongyang, Sept.
14, 2001, available at 2001 WL 27759647.
334. See Eberstadt, supra note 329, at 35 (noting that North Korean leadership was
so obstructive of their efforts to help that "Doctors Without Borders"-a private, highly
respected worldwide charitable organization-withdrew its' services in the midst of
government-engineered famine).
335. See Tanks, supra note 206.
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result, there are two options: hope that the habitually untrustworthy
North Korean leadership never launches a nuclear missile, or,
alternatively, build NMD. The choice seems clear.
Equally important, whether a dying regime or simply a sadistic one,
like Iraq or Libya, launches a missile, the President would be under
enormous pressure to respond by firing a nuclear weapon at the hostile
nation. In that situation, the President would have no choice but to
create victims out of victims: that is, the already oppressed and terrified
peoples of North Korea, Iraq, Libya, or any other rogue state would
invariably perish if their un-elected, unrepresentative, and autocratic
leaders launched a nuclear missile at the United States. With NMD,
however, the President could select a more suitable response: intercept
the missile and then destroy the rogue state's autocratic dictatorship (as
we have done to the Taliban in Afghanistan). In that respect, NMD
would help better distinguish regime elites from the people they oppress,
and thus provide the United States with higher moral credibility in how
it responds to nuclear attacks.
Finally, discussion of the threat from rogue states would not be
complete without mention of the role Afghanistan played in the
September 11 th attacks, and how it may provide yet another rationale for
NMD. As Tanks postulates, "if a state is providing sanctuary for
terrorist organizations, and that state has ballistic missiles capable of
reaching the U.S., they might feel emboldened to unleash the terrorist
cells feeling we would not retaliate. Clearly, such a situation would
• -- ,,336
make it more difficult to deter terrorist attacks. Moreover, given
Osama Bin Laden's avowed pursuit of acquiring a nuclear weapon, theval fNMD e lmo337
value of NMD seems almost self-evident. Clearly, he would not
hesitate from using a nuclear missile to inflict even more damage on the
Western World.
Americans have become increasingly supportive of NMD since
September lth as they learned in such horrific terms how terrorist
groups and rogue states will employ the most deadly means necessary to
murder Americans and those from our allied nations. Indeed, the
Council on Foreign Relations and the Pew Research Center for the
People and the Press recently found that support for NMD has risen from
336. Id.
337. See Joe Battenfeld, Bush Warns of Nuke Threat from Osama, BOSTON HERALD,
Nov. 7, 2001, at 1.
fifty-six percent to sixty-four percent since September 11 th.338 Even
more revealing, the "gender gap" on NMD support has disappeared as
women have increased their support from fifty-two percent to sixty-four
percent.339 As a result, the most recent public opinion data suggests that
Americans are united behind NMD.
However, several critics of NMD have taken the regrettable
opportunity to extrapolate our inability to deter the September 1 1th
attacks as somehow correlated to the pursuit of NMD. Most notably,
Senator Biden believes we should set aside NMD until we solve the
"terrorist problem"-as if it is unrelated to the threat posed by rogue
states and nuclear proliferation: "we can delay the debate on whether or
not we spend $100 billion or a half trillion dollars on missile defense and
deal with first things first.. .we can deal with [NMD] later ... the least
likely attack on the United States is an ICBM with a return address.
' 340
Though the more immediate threats created by both the September
11 th attacks and the subsequent anthrax attacks are alarming and deserve
our greatest attention, we cannot let eliminating Al Queda and the
Taliban give us the false sense of security that rogue states are no longer
threatening. In fact, one could argue that if we divert attention and
resources away from NMD, rogue states will not only continue to be
undeterred, but will likely gain confidence that their weapons programs
can expand at faster and more dangerous rates. And despite comments
by Senator Biden that we should focus on those attacks without "return
addresses," the link between rogue state (Afghanistan) and terrorist
group (Al Queda) has never before been more evident. Should such a
combination ever procure a nuclear missile, one can only wonder about
their combined destructive capacity. One can only ask how America
would respond if 6,000,000 people-not 6,000-were killed by a
nuclear missile attack solely because we choose not to build NMD.
Should that horrible event ever happen, we can look back to Senator
Biden's remark that "we can deal with NMD later," and not only wonder
whether we learned any lessons from September 1 Ith, but wonder more
loudly about those who we had entrusted to shape our future.
338. Moms and Missiles, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2001, at 17.
339. Id.
340. The Today Show (NBC television broadcast, Sept. 14, 2001); see also
Lawrence J. Korb, U.S. must realize there are no quick fixes, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 13,
2001, at A101. Korb, Director of Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and
Assistant Secretary of Defense during the Reagan Administration, cites as "one example
of our misplaced priorities is the fact that President Bush proposes to spend more on
missile defense in 2002 than on the entire Coast Guard... missile defense systems are of
little or no use against this new enemy." Id.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS: NMD & ITS PLACE IN HISTORY
As witnessed so often, history has a way of repeating itself when its
lessons go unlearned. One lesson of history is that aggression tends to
re-occur in far more deadly manifestations the second time around.
Sadly, one need only look back in terms of months, not years or decades,
for first-hand knowledge of the unprecedented horror caused by previous
lessons of aggression that were disregarded.
As discovered by not deterring Osama Bin Laden following his attack
on the World Trade Center, and following his attack on the U.S.
Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and following his attack on the
U.S.S. Cole, and following his repeated, unveiled declarations of abject
hatred for everything we value, our leaders simply cannot turn inwards
because political polls suggest that taking preventative action would be
unpopular. Our leaders knew that Bin Laden freely operated terrorist
camps in Afghanistan, and they knew Afghanistan was controlled by the
Taliban's ruthless and lawless government, and yet they did nothing,
because the threat seemed far and distant, and perhaps because support
would have been fleeting. Simply put, they did not think it could
happen. And then September 1 1th occurred, and they learned otherwise.
Herein lies the challenge for President Bush in ensuring that
September 11 th never be overshadowed by another date on the calendar:
he must convince-not just today, but years down the line when the
triumphs in Afghanistan fade into memory-a notoriously fickle
American public, a Congress often fixated on immediate political gains,
and, finally, a skeptical global community, that countering the possibility
of a nuclear attack should be a foremost priority. Should our leaders
ignore the lessons of September 11 th, destruction as much as a thousand
times worse than that suffered on that day of infamy may be triggered.
Thankfully, in National Missile Defense, President Bush may have the
greatest tool imaginable for preventing such catastrophe.
Indeed, NMD has the unique capacity to both alter the incentives of
regime elites and to expand the Democratic Peace. Regime elites are
truly frightened by the prospects of NMD. Should the U.S. procure the
capability to possibly intercept one or two or five of their missiles,
regime elites would be unable to threaten a democratic nation.
Moreover, as evidenced by the actions of the North Korean and Iraq,
regime elites have devoted enormous resources to obtaining the capacity
to launch a nuclear missile at a free country. By preventing them from
reaching the fruits of their efforts, our leaders may very well destabilize
their holds on the innocent peoples trapped in their nations, and thereby
help to contribute to their demise.
Regime elites are also worried because NMD would enable the
President to achieve the moral high ground in responding to one of their
nuclear threats or attacks. That is, by implementing NMD, the President
could respond to a nuclear attack by intercepting the missile instead of
retaliating with an American missile. Not only would it save millions of
innocent Americans (or Brits or any nationals), but our leaders could
localize the costs of the regime elite's action back on the regime elite. In
that situation, the missile would first be intercepted, and then the regime
elites and his associates would be pursued with as much force as
necessary. By doing so, our leaders separate the regime elites from the
peoples they oppress, and liberate those oppressed people from the
wretched hold of regime elites who wants nothing more than to
externalize all possible costs on their own people.
Expanding the Democratic Peace and the Rule of Law is also
facilitated by the creation of an NMD system that provides extended
deterrence. This effect is evidenced no more clearly than by the recent
actions of Russia and its President, Vladimir Putin. Noticeably, instead
of expressing outrage following President Bush's December 13th formal
notification of the United States' forthcoming withdrawal from the ABM
Treaty, President Putin offered only muted criticism, and, in all
likelihood, such tepid disapproval was served solely for domestic
political consumption in Russia.
Instead, President Putin's actions suggest that he has endorsed the
notion that the Democratic Peace has replaced mutually assured
destruction as the predominant world paradigm. Specifically, President
Putin has offered unprecedented offers for bilateral reductions in nuclear
arms; he has refused to denounce the value of extended deterrence as
offered by NMD; he has worked towards increasing trade between the
former adversary; and he has developed a genuinely warm relationship
with his counterpart, President Bush. In other words, President Putin
appears to realize that NMD would benefit Russia, as it would provide
Russia protection in the event that a rogue state lofted a missile in its
direction. Moreover, as demonstrated in the "NMD Discourages First
Strikes Hypothetical," NMD offers no defense against an all out Russian
nuclear attack, and thus would never encourage an American first strike.
With both nations now democracies, however, a first strike would likely
never happen anyway.
Undoubtedly, President Bush will continue to encounter opposition to
NMD. Some will point out that alternate modalities remain, though those
same critics fail to recognize that proponents of NMD have never claimed it
is the panacea to preventing all forms of nuclear attack. Rather, given
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the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the unambiguous attempts by
regime elites to acquire the means of launching such weapons, NMD would
serve as a large part of the total defense against nuclear attacks.
Other critics will assert that NMD "will never work," even though
technological obstacles never stopped our drive to succeed in previous
endeavors. Had our leaders adopted the "can't do" attitude of NMD
critics, it is likely that no one would have ever landed on the Moon or
cured diseases that were previously considered "impossible" to cure.
When critics fail in their first two arguments, they will undoubtedly
claim that NMD is simply "too expensive." As discussed, however, the
economic and moral cost of one nuclear missile detonating over an
American city would be unimaginably large and impossible to quantify.
Moreover, given the immense direct and indirect economic costs of
September 1 1th on the local, national, and international economy, the
thought of something perhaps 1,000 times worse seems frightening. In
short, the "too expensive" argument likely lost all resonance after
September 11 th.
Finally, critics will be left with their classic "NMD will destabilize world
order," argument. Again, however, their logic fails to equate with the
political realities of the 21st Century. If anything, an NMD system that
provides extended deterrence will only bring together the nations of the
democratic world, and further isolate the forty-eight remaining non-
democratic leaders who can only delay the inevitable onset of
democratization in the countries they purport to represent. Moreover, as
the "NMD Discourages First Strikes Hypothetical" demonstrates, no
nation need worry about NMD, unless that nation seeks to launch a first
strike.
Ultimately, history will judge President Bush not only by his actions
in remedying the destruction caused by Bin Laden and the Taliban, but
also by whether he capitalized on a golden opportunity to advance
missile defense. With exceedingly high approval ratings, and with
international support for his actions, President Bush must use this
unprecedented political moment to catapult NMD to the forefront of
American national security. By announcing the United States'
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty tentatively effective May 13, 2002,
and by displaying an unwavering commitment to the development of
NMD, President Bush has already made a great deal of progress. And, if
future generations regard September 1 lth, 2001 as the single most
destructive day in our nation's history, President Bush will have succeeded.
VII. APPENDIX
(Statistical & Mathematical Summary of NMD Discourages First
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U.S. launches first strike at
Russia.
Strike employs 200 unmirved
ICBMs.
Russia responds with 200
unmirved ICBMs.
140 of 200 ICBMs hit Russian
targets.
200 ICBMS x 70% ICBM




SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
effectiveness = 140
109 of 200 ICBMs hit
American targets.
Step I: NMD intercepts 45
ICBMs: NMD can only
intercept up to 75 ICBMs, at
an effectiveness rate of 60%.
(75 x 60% = 45)
Step 11: 155 ICBMs not affected
by NMD: NMD failed to
intercept 30 of 75 ICBMs, and
125 ICBMs were beyond the
reach of NMD.
(75 - 45 = 30) + 125 = 155
Step III: 109 ICBMs hit
American targets: 155






U.S. launches first strike at China.
Strike employs 200 unmirved
ICBMs.
China responds with 40
unmirved ICBMs.
140 of 200 ICBMs hit Chinese
targets.
200 ICBMS x 70% ICBM
effectiveness = 140
11 of 40 ICBMs hit American
targets.
Math: Step I: NMD intercepts 24
ICBMs (40 x 60%).
Step H: 16 ICBMs not affected
by NMD: NMD failed to
intercept all of them.
Step III: 11 ICBMs hit
American targets: 16 ICBMs
x. 70% ICBM effectiveness.
Scenario III
Setting: U.S. launches first strike at
China.
Strike employs 200 unmirved
ICBMs
China responds with 15 ICBMs
(since 25 destroyed in first
strike) (calculations for
unmirved and mirved with 10
warheads)
U.S. first strike effectiveness: 140 of 200 ICBMs hit Chinese
targets (and destroy 25
ICBMs).
Math: 200 ICBMS x 70% ICBM
effectiveness = 140
Chinese response effectiveness
(unmirved): 4 of 15 ICBMs hit American
targets.
Math: Step I: NMD intercepts 9
ICBMs (15 x 60%).
Step H: 6 ICBMs not affected
by NMD: NMD failed to
intercept all of them.
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Step III: 4 ICBMs hit American
targets: 6 ICBMs x. 70% ICBM
effectiveness.
4 of 15 ICBMs & 40 of 150
warheads hit American targets.
Step I: NMD intercepts 9
ICBMs (15 x 60%).
Step 11: 6 ICBMs not affected
by NMD: NMD failed to
intercept all of them.
Step III: 4 ICBMs hit American
targets: 6 ICBMs x. 70% ICBM
effectiveness.
Step IV: 40 warheads hit
American targets: 4 ICBMs x
10 warheads on each ICBM.
Scenario IV
Setting (A):
Chinese first strike effectiveness:
Math:
The United States does not
have NMD. China launches
first strike at Russia. Strike
employs 40 mirved ICBMs.
28 ICBMs and 280 warheads
hit Russian targets.
Step 1: 40 ICBMs at 70%
effectiveness = 28
Step 11: 280 warheads hit
Russian targets: 28 ICBMs x 10
warheads on each ICBM.
Setting (B):
Chinese first strike effectiveness:
Math:
The United States has NMD.
China launches first strike at
Russia. Strike employs 40
mirved ICBMs.
17 ICBMs and 170 warheads
hit Russian targets.
Step I: NMD intercepts 16
ICBMs: NMD can only
intercept up to 35 ICBMs
(aimed at Asia/Europe), at an
effectiveness rate of 45%.
(35 x 70% = 16)
Step 1H: 24 ICBMs not affected
by NMD: NMD failed to
intercept 19 of 35 ICBMs, and
5 ICBMs were beyond the
reach of NMD.
(35- 16 = 19) +5 = 24
Step III: 17 ICBMs hit Russian
targets: 24
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Maimon Schwarzschild, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law
Emily L. Sherwin, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law
Virginia V. Shue, B.A., J.D., Associate Dean and Professor of Law
Bernard H. Siegan, J.D., Distinguished Professor
Thomas A. Smith, A.B., B.A., J.D., Professor of Law
Allen C. Snyder, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law
Lester B. Snyder, B.S., J.D., LL.M., Professor of Law
Richard E. Speidel, A.B., LL.B., LL.M., Visiting Professor
Edmund C. Ursin, A.B., J.D., Professor of Law
Jorge A. Vargas, J.D., LL.M., Professor of Law
Donald T. Weckstein, B.B.A., J.D., LL.M., Professor of Law
Richard Wharton, B.A., J.D., Director, Environmental Law Clinic and Trial Teams
Charles B. Wiggins, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Professor of Law
Mary Jo Wiggins, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law
W. Willard Wirtz, B.A., LL.B., LL.D., Distinguished Professor of Law
Paul C. Wohlmuth, B.S., J.D., Professor of Law
Christopher T. Wonnell, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law
Fred C. Zacharias, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Professor of Law
Lawyering Skills LLMC
Alan Alvord, B.A., J.D., Instructor
Gail Greene, B.S., J.D., Instructor
Lawyering Skills I
Linda J. Barris, B.A., J.D., Instructor
Michael R. Beeman, B.A., J.D., Instructor
Toni Martison, B.S., J.D., Instructor
Heather Murr, B.A., B.S., J.D., Instructor
Leslie Oster, A.B., J.D., Director and Instructor
Stephanie K. Shingleton, B.A., J.D., Instructor
David Simon, B.A., J.D., Instructor
Administration
Joanne C. Warren, Chairman, Board of Trustees
Alice B. Hayes, B.S., M.S., Ph.D., University President
Francis M. Lazarus, A.B., M.A., Ph.D., Academic Vice President and Provost
Daniel B. Rodriguez, B.A., J.D., Dean and Professor of Law
Virginia V. Shue, B.A., J.D., Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Graduate
Programs and Professor of Law
Kevin Cole, B.A., J.D., Associate Dean and Professor of Law
Carrie Wilson, B.A., J.D., Assistant Dean for Student Affairs
Judith Carbone Bruner, B.A., J.D., Assistant Dean, Graduate Programs and Academic
Planning
Alan Alvord, A.B., J.D., Director, Administrative Hearing Program
Susan S. Benson, B.A., M.S., Director, Career Services
Nancy Carol Carter, B.S., M.S., M.L.S., J.D., Director, Katherine M. and George M.
Pardee, Jr. Legal Research Center
George Decker, B.A., J.D., Director, Law School Publications
Carl Eging, B.A., M.A., Director, Admissions and Financial Aid
Julianne B. D'Angelo Fellmeth, B.A., J.D., Administrative Director, Center for Public
Interest Law
Carole Ekstrom, Assistant Dean for Development and External Relations
Theresa A. Hrenchir, B.A., J.D., Director of Special Projects
Lisa Hillan, B.A., J.D., Practicum and Trial Team Administrator
Kathleen Johnson, B.S., M.B.A., Director, Budget and Administration
Herbert I. Lazerow, A.B., J.D., LL.M., D.E.S.S., Director, Institute on International
and Comparative Law and Professor of Law
Ruth Levor, B.A., M.S.L.S., J.D., Associate Director, Legal Research Center
Adele Lynch, B.A., J.D., Acting Director, Patient Advocacy Program
Janet Madden, B.A., M.A., J.D., Director, Academic Support Program
Donna Matias, B.A., J.D., Director, Entrepreneurship Clinic
Mike McIntyre, B.A., M.A., Associate Campus Minister, Office of University
Ministry
Leslie Oster, A.B., J.D., Director, Lawyering Skills I
M. Susan Quinn, B.A., J.D., Administrative Director, Legal Clinics
Roger T. Stattel, B.S., Technology Specialist
Elisa Weichel, B.A., J.D., Administrative Director, Children's Advocacy Institute
Richard J. Wharton, B.A., J.D., Director, Environmental Law Clinic and Trial Teams
Majorie Zhou, B.A., M.A., Registrar
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